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ABSTRACT
I once traveled to many places in northeast China with the curiosity and eagerness of
a college student. A few years later, I was fortunate enough to have the opportunity to 
drive through about fifteen states in the U.S. It is astonishing whenever I compare the 
different scenes in these two countries, and I believe any person who came hom the rest 
of the world would be amazed by the high living standards in urban as well as rural areas,
by the convenient transportation and communication, and even by the spacious land 
itself. Some people in the U.S. may never realize that the comfort and privilege they 
took for granted are the dreams and lifelong goals of people on the other parts of the 
same planet. This is the initiation of my passion to write issues associated with 
economic development and international economics. The main purpose of this 
dissertation is to provide more understanding about certain factors that may play 
important roles in economic growth and development.
The first essay, “Financial Systems and Economic Development,” investigates the 
relationships between financial systems and the levels of economic development. The 
econometric model measures the cross sectional heteroskedasticity and time wise 
autoregression. This chapter finds that financial systems are related to economic 
development, and financial institutions and markets perform differently at different 
income levels. The higher the income, the bigger the positive impacts of financial 
markets, and the higher the significance levels; while financial institutions have stronger 
impact in upper and lower-middle income countries. International trade and education 
are positively correlated with growth rate, but government consumption and inflation 
have negative impacts on long run economic growth.
IX
The second essay is entitled “Regional Economic Integration in East Asia.” This 
chapter reviews the theory and the history of regional economic integration, and 
investigates the problems and prospects in the integration process in East Asia. Based on 
theory, there is no real economic integration in East Asia so far, hut we believe that there 
are tremendous potentials and bright prospects for regional economic integration. East 
Asian countries would gain from the future regional cooperation and integration, and 
China’s active involvement would not only improve regional economic prosperity, but 
also increase political stability and balance the world power.
The third essay, “Infrastructure as a Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment 
Inflows,” attempts to investigate the role of infrastructure on foreign direct investment 
inflows. A comprehensive physical and governance infrastructure index is constructed 
with principal component analysis. The cross section study suggests that both physical 
and governance infrastructures are positively related with FDI. The random effects panel 
model indicates that Governance infrastructure has positive and significant impact on 
FDI, while physical infrastructure has mixed results. Governance infrastructure is an 
important determinant of FDI inflows, and it is necessary to improve the quality of 
governance infrastructure in order to attract foreign investment.
Chapter One 
Financial Systems and Economic Development
1.1. Introduction
The impact and evolution of financial systems have not drawn the attention of the 
development economists till the past decade. In the Handbook of Development 
Economics (Chenery and Srinivasan 1988), for example, financial systems are not even 
mentioned once in the thirty three chapters which cover topics from the structural 
transformation to human capital, from planning and resource allocation to international 
aspects. However, according to Meier (2001), financial systems have now become one 
of the central research topics in the field of development economics: “It will be 
especially important to achieve a better understanding of the evolution of financial 
institutions in the process of a country’s development... The new generation might also 
gain significant insights from more attention to the history of the evolution of markets 
and economic institutions as integral components of the development process.”
Financial systems could be broadly divided into two categories: bank-oriented 
institutions which include banks, pension funds, and insurance companies; and market- 
based financial markets which refer to the organized markets for securities such as 
stocks, bonds, futures and options.' The development of economic growth theories, 
especially market failures is the main reason for stressing the importance of financial 
systems. Asymmetric information, transaction costs, adverse selection and moral hazard 
not only challenge the classical analysis of capital markets, but also call for more 
efficient financial policies and institutional interventions (Stiglitz 1989). In most Less
This paper follows Allen and Gale’s (2000) definitions about financial institutions and markets.
Developed Countries (LDCs) where Gnancial repressions are common phenomena, the
design of a proper financial system becomes more relevant to economic development. In 
fact, economic development is a complicated process and is determined and influenced 
by many factors. Thus it is difficult to have any firm conclusion on the impact of an 
individual factor. Nonetheless, it is now accepted by most scholars that well functioning 
financial systems mobilize savings between savers and investors, allocate investment, 
supervise managers, and ameliorate risks (Levine 1997, Raj an and Zingales 1998, etc).
In a recently published book, Allen and Gale (2000) describe the historical 
development of financial systems in five major developed countries (DCs): the United 
Kingdom, United States, France, Germany and Japan. They admit that a wide range of 
different systems have existed in industrialized countries, but they leave the fundamental 
questions for future research: “(Financial institutions and financial markets) Which is the 
best system in particular circumstances, do financial systems make a substantial 
difference to economic welfare, or are they simply veils that have little effect?” Allen 
and Gale’s study does not include any LDCs, though the questions they mentioned are 
more crucial to the developing world. After the Second World War, the previous 
colonies in Africa, Asia and South America gained independence, and most of these new 
nations either have poorly developed financial systems, or have to build them from 
scratch. In contrast for most industrialized countries, the history of financial 
development could be dated back to the mid-nineteenth century. If indeed there are 
advantageous financial systems associated with specific economic development 
circumstances, then LDCs could speed up their development process and reduce the 
increasing gap between the developed and developing worlds.
The purpose of this research is to provide more understanding about financial 
systems and the level of economic development. We investigate whether financial 
intermediaries and markets have different characteristics among high, upper-middle, 
lower-middle and low income country groups.^ Theoretically, financial systems should 
be positively correlated with real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which 
means the richer the country, the more active the institutions and markets. Furthermore, 
since mature financial markets require effective law enforcement and legal frameworks, 
convenient telecommunication and transportation structures, and a well-educated labor 
force, markets could be the privilege of most DCs. On the other hand, financial 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies should be more popular than markets 
in LDCs. If our empirical investigation is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that 
financial systems are associated with development levels, it may be possible to form 
sound policy and design optimum strategies for countries under specific economic 
circumstances.
Our study includes 87 countries over a 24-year period from 1974 to 1997.^ As far as 
we know, this is the first cross section and time series (pooled) examination on the 
relationships between financial systems and economic development stages using a large 
number of DCs and LDCs. The previous studies are dominated by cross section study 
(King and Levine 1993, Levine and Zervos 1998, Knnt and Maksimovic 1998, etc), 
country specific time series (Luintel and Khan 1999, Cetorelli and Gembera 2001, etc).
 ^The World Bank country classification is based on the 2000 Gross National Income per capita. It is 
calculated using the World Bank Atlas Method. The groups are: Low income, $755 or less; lower middle 
income, $756- $2,995; upper middle income, $2,996- $9,265; and high income, $9,266 or more. We also 
build dummy variables to represent different income groups, and empirically prove that it is legitimate to 
divide our sample into these 4 categories.
 ^Country name and group classifications are listed in Appendix A.
or pooled studies with a few well developed nations (Frankel and Montgomery 1991, 
Allen and Gale 2000, etc).
We construct a cross-sectionally hetcroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model 
for the regression analysis: the disturbances are autoregressive, hetcroskedastic and 
mutually independent. Again, this methodology is novel in the literature investigating 
the nexus of financial systems and economic development. The variables discussed by 
this paper are consistent with most previous research: economic development is 
measured by real per capita GDP growth rate, and it is determined by initial GDP level, 
financial institutions and markets, education, government consumption, international 
trade and inflation. We also include indicators of information and communication cost, 
political stability, and rule of law in the robustness tests.
Our findings suggest that financial systems are related to economic development. 
First of all, the higher the income, the bigger the positive impacts of financial markets, 
and the higher the significance levels. For high and upper-middle income countries, 
three different market indicators have positive and significant coefficients, but for lower- 
middle and low income countries, there are some negative coefficients, and most of the 
positive results are not significant at the conventional levels. Second, financial 
institutions play more important roles in upper and lower-middle income groups. 
However, in high and low income countries, the coefficients measuring the roles of 
financial institutions on economic growth are mixed and insignificant. A battery of 
sensitivity analysis does not change the basic patterns of financial systems among 
different income groups. We also strengthen the existing literature on the relationships 
between growth and other explanatory variables: international trade and education are
positively correlated with growth, while government consumption and inflation have 
negative impacts on economic growth.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews the 
literature; section III explains the theoretical background and the regression model; 
section IV describes data and summary statistics; section V summarizes the results, and 
section VI concludes.
1.2. Literature Review
This chapter is related to three streams of literature: first, research comparing 
financial systems, mainly institutions and markets; second, the relationship between 
finance and growth; and third, financial liberalization, deregulation and economic 
growth.
1.2.1. Financial Systems
Theoretically speaking, financial institutions and markets should have the same 
functions, and play a similar role in economic development. However, why some 
countries developed a bank-based financial system, while others have a market-based 
mechanism is unclear. Even in the same country, financial systems evolve dramatically. 
Is it possible to design a specific form of financial system that works better in a certain 
stage of economic development? In particular, banks in Japan perform differently from 
banks in the U.S. The questions remains as to what factors really matter for the success 
of financial institutions?
Levine (2002) empirically investigates the relationship between economic growth 
and financial systems. He constructs a broad dataset comparing the activity, size, and 
efficiency of stock markets versus banks in 48 countries over the 1980-95 period. The
cross-country regression analysis indicates that good financial systems positively 
influence economic growth, but neither banks nor stock markets are particularly better.
A battery of sensitivity tests strongly supports the findings, and the author concludes that
it is not very meaningful to distinguish either bank-based or market-based financial 
structures. Instead, people should focus on the law and legal enforcement mechanisms 
that facilitate financial development. One of the contributions of this study is that it 
expands the horizon to a group of diversified nations, such as Kenya, Peru, and Sri 
Lanka. In contrast most of the previous research either is narrowed down to a specific 
cotmtry study, or involves a few similar well-developed economies. However, the data 
assembly method and econometric technique adopted by Levine ignore the tremendous 
difference of the characteristics of financial systems in DCs and LDCs.
Choe and Moosa (1999) use the Korean experience examining the impacts of 
financial intermediaries and capital markets on economic growth. Their case study 
effectively avoids the measurement issue and country specific problem encountered by 
cross-country analysis. The time series investigation with non-nested model selection 
method proves that in South Korea, financial intermediaries are more important than 
capital markets in promoting economic growth. Their conclusion is consistent with 
Raj an and Zingales’ (1999) argument that financial intermediaries perform better in most 
LDCs where the legal and institutional framework is less solid than that of DCs, and 
entrepreneurial experience is immature. Using an urban development point of view, 
Fujita (2000) argues that financial institutions suit Asian cities better. If Asian cities 
build the U.S. style financial structure, there could be more volatile crises and brutal 
adjustments.
Allen and Gale (1997) build an overlapping generation model to show that an 
intermediated financial system could eliminate non-diversifiable risk and achieve ex ante 
Pareto equilibrium; while in an economy with market only or mixed financial system, 
there is under-investment and inefficiency. Digging deeper into the myth of financial 
structures, Allen and Gale (2001) compare the current financial systems in Germany, 
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Furthermore, they discuss the 
historical development of financial structures in these countries. Their data support the 
fact that even among these five major developed countries, the financial systems are very 
different. Allen and Gale provide some interesting discussions about the pros and cons 
of banks and equity markets. Their discussion, however, is based on comparing various 
indicators instead of rigorous empirical analysis due to data limitation, measurement 
problems, and theoretical support in the evolution of financial structures. Allen and 
Gale’s study focuses on developed countries, though they agree that little attention has 
been given to the interesting and important topic concerning the different financial 
characteristics between developed and emerging countries.
Frankel and Montgomery (1991) conclude that it is difficult to interpret quantitative 
data on banking systems, assuming any are available at all. Nonetheless they compare 
the national banking systems of four countries: Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The authors discuss the banking structures, regulatory policies, 
degree of competition, relationships with customers and legal environment in each of 
these countries. They attempt to explain the relationship between bank performance and 
institutional structures. Unfortunately, the difficulty of measuring banking system 
performance and data limitations make it impossible to draw any solid conclusions.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) examine the impact of a single aspect of the banking
system, the concentration ratio, on industry growth. Their empirical findings suggest that 
bank concentration has a negative effect on long run output growth. Furthermore, they 
find a heterogeneous effect on promoting the growth of industries that are more 
dependent on external finance.
In the past three decades, financial systems changed significantly in both DCs and 
LDCs. The transaction costs and asymmetric information have become cheaper and 
more available, but intermediaries still play very important roles in both traditional 
markets and new markets featuring financial futures and options (see Allen and 
Santomero, 1998). Levine (1997) points out that we still don’t have adequate theoretical 
and empirical understanding of the emergence, development and implications of different 
financial systems.
1.2.2. Finance and Growth
This section mainly reviews relative recent literature as well as a few earlier previous 
works that are well cited by scholars. After a century long debate about the nexus 
between finance and growth, most researchers agree that finance and growth are 
positively related. Financial institutions and markets could improve total factor 
productivity by allocating savings and resources, supervising managers, ameliorating 
risks, facilitating technology innovation, and reducing transaction and information costs. 
Levine (1997) has an excellent survey providing both theoretical and empirical evidence 
on links between finance and growth.
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) construct a multiple assets endogenous growth model 
to demonstrate that financial intermediaries affect resource allocations by shifting the
composition of savings toward capital, and reducing socially unnecessary capital 
liquidation. These two channels both promote growth.
Barro (1991) tests the convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth model with 
data horn 98 countries between 1960 and 1985. His study indicates that the real per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate is positively related to initial human 
capital level, lower fertility rates, higher ratios of physical investment to GDP, and 
political stability; while negatively related to government consumption, market 
distortions, and initial level of real per capita GDP. Many scholars treat these “Barro 
Regressors” as the basic independent variables in the economic growth regression 
analysis. Levine and Zervos (1993) adopt the extreme-bounds-analysis to evaluate the 
“believability” of “Barro Regressors” and some other growth indicators. They find that a 
wide range of policy, fiscal, and monetary indicators have fragile relationships with long 
run economic growth. Notably, they find that the measurements of financial 
development are robustly correlated with economic development.
King and Levine (1993) construct financial intermediary development indicators and 
define economic growth indicators. These measurements are adopted by most finance 
and growth literature. The cross-country regression results indicate a strong positive 
correlation between finance and growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) build on King and 
Levine (1993) by broadening the financial development indicators to include stock 
markets and banks. Their cross-section study shows that both markets and intermediaries 
have positive impact on growth, and that stock markets provide different services firom 
banks. The results are consistent with Hellwig’s (1998) view that banks and markets are 
complements rather than substitutes: markets are made by intermediaries and
intermediaries rely on markets as well. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) adopt dynamic 
panel techniques to control for simultaneity bias and country specific effects. Their 
investigation supports the previous finding that the finance and growth have a robust, 
positive relationship.
Researchers have exacted tremendous effort to examine the direction of the causal 
effect between finance and growth, if any exists. There are time series (for example, see 
Luintel and Khan, 1999; Shan, Morris and Sun, 2001), Gnn level (see R^an and Zingales 
1998), and country case studies (see Koo and Kim, 1999). Unfortunately, this indicator 
is inconclusive since some of the results indicate that finance causes economic growth, 
and others imply a bi-directional causality.
1.2.3. Financial Liberalization
Financial liberalization and deregulation have spread to almost every continent since 
the 1980s. In the developing world such as East Asia and Latin America, financial 
liberalization contributes to substantial capital inflow, which helps many emerging 
markets such as South Korea and Taiwan take off and maintain impressive high growth 
rates for decades.
Levine (2001) believes that liberalization accelerates economic growth by improving 
the functioning of domestic financial systems. Rivera-Batiz (2001) builds a general 
equilibrium, endogenous growth model incorporating corruption as an integral part of the 
government in a developing economy. The impact of financial liberalization in this study 
is ambiguous; gain or loss in long run economic growth depends on the amount of influx 
or flight of capital. Stiglitz (2000) argues that without an effective regulatory 
framework, financial liberalization is the core of instability and financial crises. Shleifer
10
and Vishny are two of the most prominent contemporary scholars connecting legal rules 
and financial development. Their cross-country studies show that countries with good 
investor protection and more effective law enforcement perform better at providing Srms 
with external Gnance (See Shleifer, Vishny and etc. 1997,1998). Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) also Gnd that a well-developed legal system is important in 
promoting financial development and firm growth. Cho (1986) emphasizes that in most 
of the LDCs where mature securities markets are not in place, adverse selection and 
moral hazard prevent the ideal optimum result of liberalization; therefore governments 
should maintain some controls on the banking sectors.
1.3. Theoretical Background and Methodology
1.3.1. Theoretical Background
The extensive theoretical arguments about financial systems and economic 
development can be divided into two categories. The first one is associated with the 
Solow model (1957), endogenous or neoclassical growth theory, which emphasizes the 
function of capital accumulation, investment or entrepreneurship on long run economic 
growth. In an economy with well-developed financial systems, individuals have the 
incentive to save since financial investments offer them returns and the choice of 
diversified portfolios guarantee them easy asset liquidation. The pooling of household 
savings provides entrepreneurs with capital for investments that could benefit from 
economy of scales or technology innovation. Financial intermediaries not only raise 
savings rates, reducing unnecessary capital liquidation, but also increase the percentage 
of savings used for investment and improve the productivity of capital. (Pagano 1993; 
Bencivenga and Smith 1991).
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The second category is closely related to the frictions of classical finance theory. The 
Arrow-Debren-MacKenzie (ADM) model is based on complete, perfectly competitive 
markets. Unfortunately, this ideal world does not exist. As a matter of fact, information
is asymmetrically distributed and costly, financial contracts create moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems, and managers and shareholders have to deal with incentive 
issues. Thus, it is unreasonable to believe that the free market would perform optimally, 
if it functions at all. Good financial systems arise to facilitate the trading, hedging, 
diversifying, and pooling of risk, and to monitor managers (Levine 1997). Stiglitz 
(1989) also points out that in LDCs, the lack of efficient financial systems is one of the 
main reasons for the dismal economic situation. According to Stiglitz, financial 
intermediaries are the central allocation, monitoring and accounting systems rather than 
passive conduits for capital.
1.3.2. Methodology
Our empirical analysis consists of four sets of regression analyses based on the four 
income groups. For each group, we adopt a cross-sectionally hetcroskedastic and 
timewise autoregressive model. We assume the regression disturbances are 
autoregressive, heteroskedastic and mutually independent. The model in matrix form is
The error term has the following three characteristics:
Heteroskedasticity: E{el)  = cr.
Cross section independence: E(g.^g .J -  0
Autocorrelation: + //f,
-7 /(0 ,^ ;,), z = 1,2,...,87; r = 1,2,...,6.
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Where represents economic growth, includes both financial markets and
institutions measurements and an information set, such as School Enrollment, 
Government Consumption, Trade, and Inflation. The basic regression model could be 
written as
= a  + /),,, l n ( 7 h f )
+ + Aif ln(.HwyManCqpif<3f^  )
+  4-g,,
The logarithm of the number of TV or Newspaper per 1,000 people is also added into 
the information set as the proxy of information and communication costs in the 
robustness test. Although indicators such as the number of Internet servers or the cost of 
telephone calls are adopted by some researchers, they are not feasible in our study 
because of limited data sources in many developing countries.
1.4. Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this chapter are from the World Rank’s World Development 
Indicators (2001), the World Bank Financial Development and Structure dataset (1999), 
the World Bank Governance dataset and Penn World Table (6.1). The 87 nations 
included in the study are categorized into 4 groups: high, upper-middle, lower-middle 
and low income economies. The data are in both time series & cross-section and cross- 
section formats. For pooled data, we opt for four-year averages from 1974 to 1997^ * for 
the regression analysis. There are two explanations for this approach. First, yearly time 
spans are too short to be appropriate for studying economic development because short- 
term disturbances may influence the conclusion. Second, it is more accurate to use the
The first observation for each group of stock market and financial institution indicators is based on 3-year 
average (1975-1977) due to data limitations.
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average value to measure the financial development since some LDCs did not have data 
collecting mechanisms till recent years.
We define the economic development and financial system indicators; explain other 
explanatory variables and present summary statistics and correlations in the rest of this 
section. Meanwhile, a detailed data description is listed in the Appendix 1.2.
1.4.1. Economic Development Indicators
Economic development captures both wealth accumulation and distribution. For 
decades, measuring the wealth distribution has been a dilemma for economists. 
Undoubtedly, real per capita GDP and Gross National Product (GNP) growth rates 
indicate only economic growth. They are however, the best variables available given the 
time span and broad geographical regions covered by this chapter. Our analysis focuses 
on real per capita GDP growth rate, and treats the GNP growth rate as the alternative 
measurement in the robustness test. We also include the initial level of real per capita 
GDP as an independent variable to test the growth convergence effects.
1.4.2. Financial System Measurements
It has been a daunting challenge for researchers to compile any sound financial 
system measurements for developing countries. In most LDCs, informal institutions and
markets such as credit unions and private moneylenders prevail in the rural areas; 
moreover, it is difficult to evaluate how important the informal sectors are. Financial 
systems also vary dramatically from country to country. The experience from one 
country could not be extended to another, making it difficult to generalize any
14
measurement to all developing countries^. We adopt the World Bank Financial 
Development and Structure Database (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2000), which 
is based on the International Monetary Fund's Financial Statistics and Emergrng Market 
Database. Currently, it is the best financial system data source for LDCs, and it is 
frequently employed in the finance and growth literature.
Financial Institution development is measured by two indicators: .Bow* and BowA 
OfAer is dehned as the ratio of claims on the private sector by deposit
money banks and GDP; it concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other than the 
central bank. BawA <6 OiAer ThgiAwrfowg is defined similar to DowA except that it 
includes claims by both deposit money hanks and other financial institutions including 
savings banks, mortgage banks and finance companies, insurance companies, private 
pension and provident funds, pooled investment schemes and development banks. These 
two indicators measure the activity of financial institutions in one of its main functions: 
channeling savings to investors.
Financial Market is represented by stock markets. There are three indicators: 
Copffa/fzoffoM, and Twrwover jZof/o. equals the value of
listed shares divided by GDP, indicating the size of the stock market. Tlrwkff
measures the activity or liquidity of the stock markets, defined as total shares traded on 
the stock market exchange divided by GDP. Turnover Ratio is an efficiency indicator of 
the stock market; defined as the ratio of the value of total shares traded and market 
capitalization, measuring the activity or liquidity of a stock market relative to its size.
 ^Haggard and Lee (1995) provide some good examples of how different the financial systems and policies 
are in LDCs. Their investigations include Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines from 
East Asia, and Chile and Brazil from Latin America.
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These financial system measurements are adopted and discussed by Levine and 
Zervos (1998) who average the data of 47 counties over the 1976-93 period. We expand
both the sample size and time range, and more importantly, our pooled study also 
captures the dynamic change of financial systems over the decades.
1.4.3. Other Explanatory Variables
There are four conventional variables constituting the basic information set®: 
.ÿgcowffafy ExygwdrAffg,
Trade, and Inflation. This chapter also includes the number of Newspapers or TVs in 
use per 1,000 people as a proximate indicator for the information cost in the sensitivity 
analyses. The previous literature used variables such as the number of patents granted 
each year or the research and development expenditure as the additional indicators to 
measure technology level, however, most developing countries do not have these data 
available at all, or only have a few observations in late 90s.
1.4.4. Summary Statistics
Tables 1.1 -  1.4 show the summary statistics for each income group. Financial 
systems show substantial differences among income groups, especially between high 
income countries, which are dominated by developed nations, and the rest of the LDCs. 
For example, the average level of gafit is 0.79 in the high-income
group, compared with 0.295, 0.302 and 0.166 in upper-middle, lower-middle, and low 
income countries, respectively. For the three LDCs groups, the financial system 
indicators have similar values in middle income countries, while for low income 
economies, the values reduce to about half of their counterparts.
® Most researchers adopted the variables discussed by Barro (1991) as the determinants of long ran 
economic growth.
1 6
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: High Income Countries (Annual Averages 1974-97)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Obser­
vations
GDP per capita 0.023679 0.018731 0.065142 0.002635 0.016015 27
Growth Rate
Bank & Other 0.791182 0.741078 1.634056 0.213162 0.37166 27
Institutions
Bank 0.59763 0.54035 1.390905 0.213162 0.291196 27
Capitalization 0.37522 0.237519 1.391485 0.037824 0.329084 27
Value Traded 0.177086 0.141112 0.935407 0.007331 0.198078 27
Turnover Ratio 0.420062 0.332643 1.759028 0.084051 0.332223 27
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Upper-middle Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Obser­
vations
GDP per capita 0.012737 0.012598 0.051765 -0.0379 0.020637 21
Growth Rate
Bank & Other 0.29475 0.276113 0.727422 0.000282 0.188215 20
Institutions
Bank 0.244703 0.22158 0.556419 0.000282 0.156739 20
Capitalization 0.180421 0.086697 1.120824 0.008642 0.248299 21
Value Traded 0.044675 0.011434 0.43032 0.000577 0.09243 21
Turnover Ratio 0.285515 0.214767 1.283398 0.009891 0.334496 21
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: Lower-middle Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Obser­
vations
GDP per capita 0.013869 0.009656 0.06873 -0.0081 0.018538 26
Growth Rate
Bank & Otlier 0.301772 0.254918 0.841756 0.073464 0.210916 26
Institutions
Bank 0.249899 0.202663 0.841756 0.073464 0.180625 26
Capitalization 0.140383 0.071019 1.200647 0.002947 0.247161 25
Value Traded 0.030981 0.011066 0.163648 0.000115 0.044775 26
Turnover Ratio 0.2844 0.122446 1.957446 0.007917 0.423743 26
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: Low Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Obser­
vations
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
-0.000308 0.003165 0.049009
0.110408
0.038345 13
Bank & Other 
Institutions
0.165561 0.143837 0.336208 0.025386 0.098375 13
Bank 0.148496 0.138027 0.336208 0.025386 0.090123 13
Capitalization 0.073123 0.07423 0.150194 0.001351 0.045287 13
Value Traded 0.010817 0.003497 0.042473 0.000421 0.013995 13
Turnover Ratio 0.139865 0.051892 0.504524 0.008594 0.156096 13
The different characteristics between DCs and LDCs are enhanced by figures 1.1 -
1.5. We graph the two hnancial institution measurements, BawA and .BawA & OfAer 
and three hnancial market indicators, and
Turnover Ratio separately. These figures emphasize the comparisons between 
developed and developing countries, and represent the dynamic changes by the four-year 
averages fi-om 1974 to 1997.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate that in developed countries, the claims on the private 
sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions increased by more than 
50% in the 24 years period. Meanwhile, the gap between developed and developing 
countries also increased dramatically. In developing countries, the performance of the 
financial institutions in lower-middle income countries caught up with those of upper- 
middle income countries in the 90s, though in the 70s and 80s, the scenarios were the 
opposite. Figures 1.3 to 1.5 represent the changes of the stock market size, activity, and 
efficiency. High income countries experienced 300% and 400% increase in 
CopAa/fzafwM and MzZwe Traded, respectively. However, LDCs showed relatively 
insignificant improvements in financial market performances.
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Figure 1.1: Development Æ OfAer
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Note: This graph plots the four-year average o f Bank & Other Institutions, the Private Credit by Deposit 
Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions as the percentage o f GDP. Numbers 1 to 6 on the horizontal 
axis represent 74-77, 78-81, 82-85, 86-89, 90-93, 94-97, respectively. " High Income — - Upper- 
middle Income — *— Lower-middle Income Low Income. The symbols for the other figures are
similarly defined.
Figure 1.2: Development of Bank
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Note: This graph plots the four-year average of Bank, the Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks as the 
percentage of GDP. The axes and symbols are the same with Figure 1.1,
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Figure 1.3: Development of
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Note: This graph plots tlie four-year average o f Capitalization, the value o f listed shares divided by Gross 
Domestic Product, indicating the size o f  the stock market. The axes and symbols are the same with Figure 
1. 1.
Figure 1.4: Development of Mz/wg
4
3
2
1
0
1
Note: This graph plots the four-year average of Value Traded, the total shares traded on the stock market 
exchange divided by Gross Domestic Product, measuring the activity or liquidity o f the stock markets. 
The axes and symbols are the same with Figure 1,1.
2 0
Figure 1.5: The Development of Turnover üafzo
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Note: This graph plots the four-year average o f Turnover Ratio, the efficiency indicator o f the stock 
market; defined as the ratio o f the value of total shares traded and market capitalization, measuring the 
activity or liquidity o f a stock market relative to its size. The axes and symbols are the same with Figure 
1 . 1 .
Tables 1.5 -  1.8 present the correlation matrixes for the four income groups. There 
are some interesting similarities and differences among income groups.
First, because of the statistical measurement method, .Bow A & OfAer fwsüfwt/oMs and 
Bank are highly correlated for all the income groups. For example, the correlation 
coefficient for high income countries is 0.8114; for upper-middle, lower-middle, and low 
income groups is 0.8574, 0.9565 and 0.9358, respectively.
Second, the indicator for the stock market size, has strong correlation
with financial institutions measurements for high and upper-middle income countries. 
The four coefficients are all above 0.5236. For the lower-middle income group, the 
coefficients decrease slightly, but still are greater than 0.3754. The high correlation 
between and Bant & OtAer fAst&MtfOMs or BowA further indicates that
financial institutions and financial markets are complements, just as Hellwig (1998)
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argued that markets and intermediaries rely on each other. For the low income group, 
one of the two coefficients showed negative sign (-0.0798). It is interesting to discover 
the differentiation, but it is hard to draw any conclusion because there are only 13 low 
income countries in this category, and we have to treat the data from these countries with 
a grain of salt. Pa/Mg the stock market activity or liquidity indicators have
similar relationships with financial institutions as those of CqpfiaffzaiioM except the 
coefficients for the low income group are also above 0.3861.
Third, the correlation levels between and Mzfxfg Trm/gff are at 0.6853
and 0.9046 for high and upper-middle income countries, while those for lower-middle 
and low income drop to 0.3587 and 0.3937. These results indicate that financial markets 
are more active and efficient in countries with relatively high income levels.
Fourth, in high income economies, though the real per capita GDP growth rate is 
positively correlated with financial institutions, the coefficients are as small as 0.0879 
and 0.0961. However, those for Capifoffzafion and Fofng Trmkd are more than ten 
times higher at 0.3833 and 0.1156. For the rest of the LDCs, most of the coefficients for 
GDP growth rate and financial systems are 0.3 or 0.4, and there is no obvious 
discrepancy between institutions and markets. The results also strongly indicate that 
institutions and markets perform differently in developed and developing countries.
This chapter treats Turnover Ratio as a reference instead of a factor under vigorous 
discussion since it is defined as the ratio of the value of total shares traded and market 
capitalization. It is based on the other two market indicators, and Fo/ne
measuring the activity or liquidity relative to the market size.
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Table 1.5: Correlation Matrix: High Income Countries (Aimnal Averages 1974-97)
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
Bank & Other 
Institutions
Bank Capitalization Value
Traded
Turnover
Ratio
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
1.000000 - -
Bank & Other 
Institutions
0.087946 1.000000 -
Bank 0.096054 0.811388 1.000000 - - -
Capitalization 0.383305 0.523593 0.579768 1.000000 - -
Value Traded 0.115555 0.766147 0.771889 0.685344 1.000000 -
Turnover Ratio 0.064340 0.559197 0.523086 0.156331 0.773415 1.000000
Table 1.6: Correlation Matrix: Upper-middle Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
GDP per capita Bank & Other Bank 
Growth Rate Institutions
Capitalization Value Turnover
Traded Ratio
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate 
Bank & Other 
Institutions 
Bank
Capitalization 
Value Traded 
Turnover Ratio
1.000000
0.144703
0.346897
0.406040
0.380743
-0.200167
1.000000
0.857417
0.753458
0.612710
1.000000
0.574865
0.477534
-0.396707 -0.442958
1.000000
0.904569
-0.091694
1.000000
0.131247 1.000000
Table 1.7: Correlation Matrix: Lower-middle Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
Bank & Other 
Institutions
Bank Capitalization Value
Traded
Turnover
Ratio
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
1.000000 - - - - -
Bank & Other 
Institutions
0.468007 1.000000 - - - -
Bank 0.591274 0.956547 1.000000 - - -
Capitalization -0.133981 0.571873 0.375395 1.000000 - -
Value Traded 0.639560 0.700006 0.699508 0.358710 1.000000 -
Turnover Ratio 0.570114 0.421356 0.552280 -0.108304 0.660762 1.000000
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Table 1.8: Correlation Matrix; Low Income Countries (Annual Ave. 1974-97)
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
Bank & Other 
Institutions
Bank Capitalization Value
Traded
Turnover
Ratio
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate
1.000000 - - - - -
Bank & Other 
Institutions
0.321497 1.000000 - - - -
Bank 0.386749 0.935777 1.000000 - - -
Capitalization -0.034257 0.169550 -0.079763 1.000000 - -
Value Traded 0.692108 0.386118 0.414308 0.393736 1.000000 -
Turnover Ratio 0.667780 0.339194 0.390528 0.316257 0.953780 1.000000
1.5. Regression Results
Tables 1.9 -  1.12 report the pooled regression results with real per capita GDP 
growth rate as the economic development indicator. The impacts of financial institutions 
and markets on long run economic growth deviate among income groups.
For the high income countries, every financial market indicator has a positive and 
significant coefficient, which indicates that financial markets play active roles on 
economic development in developed countries. However, all of the financial institution 
measurements have negative signs, though most of the negative coefficients are not 
significant at the conventional confidence level. The result conflicts with the conclusions 
of the previous cross section studies that both stock market and banking development are 
positively correlated with economic growth (See Levine and Zervos, 1998, etc.). The 
inconsistency between the previous studies and our results is associated with separating 
the sample nations into four income groups. In the robustness analysis, we combine the 
87 countries and run a single cross section study, and the regression result is consistent 
with those of the other scholars.
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Independent
Table 1.9: Regression Results for 27 High Income Countries
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth
Bank & Other 
Institutions
-0.0010024
(0.599)
-0.0020537
(0.356)
-0.0005232
(0.795)
Bank -0.0071221
(0.006)
-0.0125227
(0.000)
Capitalization 0.0067903
(0.001)
0.0065746
(0.001)
Value
Traded
0.0081876
(0.049)
0.0089153
(0.030)
Turnover
Ratio
0.00774055
(0.001)
Notes: The first line o f each result is the coefficient, and P-Value is in parentheses.
Dependent variables are the real per capita GDP growth rate. Explanatory variables: Bank =  Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
to GDP; Bank & Institutions = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks atrd Other Financial Institutions to GDP; Capitalization = 
Stock M arket Capitalization /  GDP; Value Traded = Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP; Turnover = Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio; the independent variables also include logarithm o f the real per capita GDP in the first o f  every four year period; logarithm of 
secondary School Enrollment; Government Consumption /  GDP, Trade / GDP, and Inflation. Tlie regression with Bank and Turnover 
Ratio as the market and institution indicator, respectively, could not be completed due to missing data.
Table 1.10; Regression Results for 21 Upper-middle Income Countries
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth
Bank & Other 
Institutions
Bank
-0.0483517
(0.003)
0.0032344
(0.765)
Capitalization 0.0433135 
(0 .000)
Value
Traded
Turnover
Ratio
0.021207
(0.081)
0.0030024
(0.705)
0.0068851
(0.239)
-0.0350619 0.0093902 0.0058307 
(0.062) (0.564) (0.661)
0.0339421
(0.000)
0.0177258
(0.145)
0.0070915
(0.216)
Notes: The first line o f each result is the coefficient, the second line is Z, and P-Value is in parentheses.
Dependent variables are the real per capita GDP growth rate. Explanatory variables: Bank =  Private Credit by Deposit M oney Banks 
to GDP; Bank & Institutions = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions to GDP; Capitalization = 
Stock Market Capitalization /  GDP; Value Traded = Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP; Turnover = Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio; the independent variables also include logarithm of the real per capita GDP in the first o f  every four year period; logarithm of 
secondary School Enrollment; Government Consumption / GDP, Trade /  GDP, and Inflation.
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Table 1.11: Regression Results for 26 Lower-middle Income Countries
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable; Real per Capita GDP Growth
Bank & Other 
Institutions
Bank
0.02959
(0.033)
0.0137633
(0.175)
0.0096404
(0.401)
0.0261316 0.0236462 0.011611 
(0.155) (0.114) (0.390)
Capitalization
Value
Traded
Turnover
Ratio
-0.0072259
(0.490)
0.0030436
(0.751)
0.0260961
(0.000)
0.1184316
(0.000)
0.1334158
(0.000)
0.0264727
(0.000)
Notes: The first line o f each result is the coefficient, and P-Value is in parentheses.
Dependent variables are the real per capita GDP growth rate. Explanatory variables: Bank = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
to GDP; Bank & Institutions =  Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions to GDP; Capitalization = 
Stock Market Capitalization /  GDP; Value Traded = Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP; Turnover = Stock M arket Turnover 
Ratio; the independent variables also include logarithm o f the real per capita GDP in the first o f  every four year period; logarithm of 
secondary School Enrollment; Government Consumption /  GDP, Trade /  GDP, and Inflation.
Table 1.12; Regression Results for 13 Low Income Countries
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth
Bank & Other 
Institutions
-0.0035687
(0.928)
-0.0060608
(0.900)
-0.0258412
(0.582)
Bank -0.0075648
(0.849)
-0.0153607
(0.775)
-0.0215226
(0.675)
Capitalization -0.0043175
(0.909)
-0.0029132
(0.938)
Value
Traded
0.3046644
(0.029)
0.3333772
(0.021)
Turnover
Ratio
0.0149042
(0.426)
0.0137092
(0.474)
Notes: The first line o f  each result is the coefficient, and P-Value is in parentheses.
Dependent variables are the real per capita GDP growth rate. Explanatory variables: Bank =  Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
to GDP; Bank & Institutions = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial institutions to GDP; Capitalization = 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP; Value Traded = Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP; Turnover = Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio; the independent variables also include logarithm o f the real per capita GDP in the first o f  every four year period; logarithm of 
secondary School Enrollment; Government Consumption / GDP, Trade /  GDP, and Inflation.
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For the upper-middle income group, financial market coefficients are still positive, 
but half of the values are not significant at 90% confidence level. The negative 
coefficients of institutions reduce to one third of the total, though none of the positive 
values is significant.
Interestingly enough, for the lower-middle income countries, all financial institution 
measurements turn out to be positive, and one of the market indicators,
shows up to be negative. Similar to the institutional coefficients in the high income 
group, the negative value for market is not consistent with the previous studies, which 
universally conclude that financial markets and growth are positively correlated. 
However, it is necessary to emphasize that none of the previous empirical studies 
separate the sample countries into four income groups, and our cross section comparison 
study using Ordinary Least Square technology generates the same conclusion as the 
previous literature.
The results for the low income group are mixed and none of them except one is 
significant at 10 percent confidence level, which is associated with the fact that in some 
of the low income countries, financial systems are either poorly developed, or simply 
don't exist.
The basic regression results are consistent with our hypothesis that financial systems 
are correlated with income levels. Due to the requirements of an effective legal 
framework, low telecommunication and transportation costs, and good human capital, 
financial markets are more important in DCs instead of LDCs. While financial 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies are more popular than markets in 
LDCs. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables are consistent with the
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previous studies: trade and secondary school enrollment have positive impacts on growth
while government consumption and inflation have negative coefficients.
Table 1.13; Robustness Test for High Income Countries
Independent Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth 
Variables
Bank & Other 
Institutions
-0.0013373
(0.598)
-0.0039613
(0.113)
-0.0015298
(0.507)
Bank -0.01006
(0.012)
-0.0130487
(0.000)
-0.0120751
(0.006)
Capitalization 0.0012031
(0.653)
0.0012952
(0.586)
Value
Traded
0.0094995
(0.031)
0.0105388
(0.009)
Turnover
Ratio
0.006203
(0.002)
0.0074329
(0.000)
Logarithm of
Newspaper
0.0052142
(0.001)
0.0059934
(0.000)
0.0053733
(0.001)
0.0052186
(0.000)
0.0048666
(0.001)
0.0051904
(0.000)
Notes: The first line o f each result is the coefficient, and P-Value is in parentheses.
Dependent variables are the real per capita GDP growth rate. Explanatory variables: Bank = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
to GDP; Bank & Institutions = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions to GDP; Capitalization = 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP; Value Traded = Stock Market Total Value Traded /  GDP; Turnover =  Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio; the independent variables also include logarithm o f the real per capita GDP in the first o f  every four year period; logarithm of 
secondary School Enrollment; Government Consumption /  GDP, Trade / GDP, Inflation and the logarithm o f the number o f 
newspaper per 1000 people.
We run a wide array of robustness tests. First, the logarithm of the number of 
newspaper or TV set per 1000 people is added into the information set as the proxy of 
information and communication cost. We then substitute the dependent variable with 
real per capita GNP growth rate. Lastly, we add political stability or rule of law in the 
cross section study to test the influence of legal factors in economic growth. All the 
sensitivity analyses do not change the basic findings of this paper. We report only one 
test result in table 1.13, where the logarithm of the number of newspaper per 1000 people 
is added into the regression analysis as an additional explanatory variable. The 
sensitivity analyses in table 1.13 confirm the findings reported in table 1.9 that for high
28
income countries, financial markets are positively and significantly correlated with real 
per capita GDP growth rate, while institutions show negative correlation.
1.6. Conclusions
This chuter empirically investigates the relationship between financial systems and 
economic development. The 87 countries included in this study are divided into high,
upper-middle, lower-middle and low income groups. With the cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive econometric technology, we find that 
financial institutions and markets do perform differently at different income levels.
As Table 1.9 and 1.13 indicated, in the high income countries, financial markets are 
positively and significantly correlated with real per capita GDP growth at 90% or 99% 
confidence level. For the upper-middle income group, markets still show positive 
coefficients, but only half of them are significant at 90% confidence level. For the 
lower-middle and low income nations, there are mixed results: the market
size indicator, has negative coefficient, but stock market total Pa/we 7ra</e</ and 
Taraavgr j(a^a are positively related with the dependent variable. The regression results 
are consistent with our hypotheses that markets are more active in developed countries 
where law enforcement, legal fi-amework, human coital, communication technology, 
and etc. reach relatively high standards to support and maintain the financial markets.
On the other hand, financial institutions are positively correlated with real per capita 
GDP growth rate in the lower-middle income countries. However, the coefficients have 
mixed signs in the upper-middle income group, furthermore, in the high income 
economies, the results are overwhelmingly negative even if most of them are not 
significant. For the low income group, we have to admit first that due to the small
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sample size (13 countries) and the questionable reliability of the data sources, future 
research is required for the investigation of institutions and markets. Table 1.12 shows 
that most of the financial system measurements have negative coefficients though none 
of them is significant at the conventional confidence level. These results imply that in 
the low income countries, Gnancial systems may not function properly, if  they function at 
all.
This chapter indicates that financial markets and institutions play different roles in 
different income groups. At a specific income level, financial institutions and markets do 
not necessarily both have positive and significant impacts on economic growth, as 
previous study concluded. For example, in the high income countries, markets are 
positively and significantly correlated with real per capita GDP growth rate, but 
institutions have negative and insignificant coefficients.
This study also strengthens the understanding of some of the explanatory variables 
with the econometric technique that hasn’t been used for financial systems studies 
before: the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model. Our 
analyses are consistent with previous research, indicating that international trade and 
education are positively correlated with the growth rate, but government consumption 
and inflation have negative impacts on long run economic growth.
Apart &om the above contributions, there are a number of hmitations that deserve 
future research. First, this chapter does not consider financial dualism, a common 
practice in many LDCs. The informal financial systems not only vary from country to 
country, but also prevail mainly in the rural areas. Thus it is a daunting task to measure 
financial dualism or generalize the experience from one to the other developing
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countries. Second, we have to treat the data 6om some developing countries with
caution, and the questionable data may generate biased regression results. Finally, our 
study covers 87 countries over a 24-year period, which is the longest time series data 
available for some developing countries. Since this chapter adopted the four-year 
average data for economic development measurements, and indicators of financial 
systems and variables in the information set to reduce the short-term disturbances and 
business cycle effects, the limited time series observation for each country is not 
sufficient to investigate causality between economic development and financial systems.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.1: Country Classification
27 High Income Countries
Australia
Cyprus
Germany
Ireland 
Korea, Rep.
Norway
Switzerland
Austria
Denmark
Greece
Israel
Luxembourg 
Singapore 
United Kingdom
21 Upper-middle Income Countries
Argentina
Chile
Hungary
Mauritius
Poland
Barbados 
Costa Rica 
Latvia 
Mexico 
Saudi Arabia
Trinidad and Tobago 
26 Lower-middle Income Countries
Bolivia
Ecuador
Guatemala
Jordan
Peru
South Africa 
Tunisia
Bulgaria
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Honduras 
Morocco 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Turkey
13 Low Income Countries
Armenia
India
Nepal
Zimbabwe
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Nigeria
Belgium
Finland
Hong Kong, China 
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
United States
Botswana 
Croatia 
Lithuania 
Oman 
Slovak Rep.
China
El Salvador
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Namibia
Romania
Swaziland
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Pakistan
Canada
France
Iceland
Japan
New Zealand 
Sweden
Brazil 
Czech Rep. 
Malaysia
Panama
Uruguay
Colombia
Fiji
Jamaica
Paraguay
Russian Federation 
Thailand
Ghana
Mongolia
Zambia
* Source: World Bank Country Classification.
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Appendix 1.2: Data Description
1.2.1: Economic Growth Indicators
Initial Real per Logarithm of the real per capita Gross Domestic Product (constant 1995 US$)
Capita GDP in the first o f every four-year period from 1974 to 1997. There are 6
observations for each country: in year 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, and 1994.
Real per Capita Annual growth rate o f per capita Gross Domestic Product based on constant
GDP Growth 1995 U.S. dollars. Population is the midyear level.
Real per Capita Annual growth rate o f Gross National Product per capita based on constant
GNP Growth 1995 U.S. dollars.
1.2.2: Bank and Financial Institution Development Indicators
Private Credit by 
Deposit Money 
Banks / GDP
Private Credit by 
Deposit Money 
Banks and Otlier 
Financial Institutions 
/G DP
Claims on the private sector by deposit money banks divided by Gross 
Domestic Product. This banking sector development indicator concentrates on 
credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank, and it measures the 
activity of financial intermediaries in one of its main fimction; channeling 
savings to investors.
This indicator is defined similar to the previous one except that it includes 
claims by both deposit money banks and other financial institutions. Other- 
financial institutions include bank like institutions such as savings bank, 
mortgage banks and finance companies, insurance companies, private pension 
and provident funds, pooled investment schemes and development banks.
1.2.3: Stock Market Development Indicators
Stock Market 
Capitalization / GDP
The value of listed shares divided by Gross Domestic Product, mdicating the 
size o f the stock market.
Stock Market Total 
Value Traded / GDP
Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio
Defined as total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by Gross 
Domestic Product, measuring the activity or liquidity o f the stock markets.
An efficiency indicator of the stock market; defined as the ratio of the value of 
total shares traded and market capitalization, measuring the activity or liquidity 
of a stock market relative to its size.
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Continued
Appendix 1.2: Data Description
1.2.4: Other Indicators
Secondary School 
Enrollment (% gross)
Government
Consumption
(% ofGDP)
Trade (% of GDP)
Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %)
Television sets (per 
1,000 people)
Research and 
development 
expenditure (% of 
GNI)
Logarithm of the ratio o f total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to tire level of education shown.
General government final consumption expenditure as the percentage of GDP.
The smn of exports and imports o f goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product.
Measured by the annual growth rate o f the GDP implicit deflator, the ratio of 
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. This indicator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole.
Number of television sets in use per 1,000 people.
The ratio of current and capital expenditures (including overhead) on creative, 
systematic activity intended to increase the stock o f knowledge and Gross 
National Income. Both fundamental and applied research and experimental 
development work are included.
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Chapter Two 
Regional Economic Integration in East Asia
2.1. Introduction
Regional economic integration has been one of the distinguishing features of the 
post-war world. In Europe, the European Union (EU)’ has evolved from a loose custom 
union toward a monetary integration, and the number of member states has enlarged from 
the original 6 into 15. The achievements of the EU are not only economic, but also 
political; it has played a major role in boosting the agricultural products in the member 
countries, in improving intra-regional trade and cooperation, and in sustaining peace and 
stability. Though some goals have not been achieved, Europe “may have to be satisfied 
with a half loaf rather than a full loaf, at least in the short run (Kondonassis, 1989).” In 
North America, Mexico joined the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and these three 
nations formed the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in the early 90s.
Compared with EU, which is dominated by the developed countries, NAFTA is the 
combination ofboth developed and developing economies. There are some other 
developing country integration schemes such as the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), the East Ahican Common 
Market (EACM), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
East Asia* has nearly a 1.9 billion population, and its economic reform strategies and 
growth miracles are impressive from many perspectives in the past twenty years. The
’ The European Union (EU) was founded on November 1st, 1993. It was formerly known as the European 
Economic Community (EEC) or European Community (EC).
® Following the World Bank publication “Innovative East Asia: The Future o f Growth” by Shahid Yusuf 
(2003), East Asia is defined as China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), Thailand, and Vietnam.
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future performance of East Asia will strongly influence the trajectory of international 
trade and the improvement of world wealth. East Asia countries have been investigating 
the possibility of building a cooperative regional block to leverage economic growth 
decades ago, but due to the differences in country size, culture, linguistic, and political 
influence &om the United States and former Soviet Union, the integration process has 
been slow and preliminary. Since the 1990s, East Asia has been an active member in the 
Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC).
This chapter reviews the theory and the history of regional economic integration, and 
investigates the problems and prospects in the integration process in East Asia. China is 
the most populous and spacious country in this region, and has steadily become an 
important force in the global economic arena and political forum. China’s involvement 
in regional economic integration would not only improve regional economic prosperity, 
but also increase political stability and balance the world power. Based on theory, there 
is no real economic integration in East Asia so far, but we believe that East Asian 
countries would gain from the future regional cooperation and integration, and China will 
play a crucial role in this process.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section II discusses the development of 
economic integration theories. Section III reviews the history of regional economic 
integration. Experiences from the previous integration schemes are summarized in 
Section IV. Section V investigates the problems and prospects in the integration process 
in East Asia, followed by Section VI discussing the economic integration process in East 
Asia, especially China’s potential role on improving regional economic prosperity and 
political stability, and Section VII concludes.
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2.2. Theories of Regional Economic Integration
The classical economic integration theory has been the so-called static effects 
introduced by Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1960). Unfortunately, the empirical tests aimed
at quantifying the static effects are very difficult. As Kondonassis and Malliaris (1996) 
point out that most of the arguments about the static effects are verbal instead of detailed 
computation. Furthermore, according to the limited empirical studies, the static effects 
are quite small, if not negative. In order to explain the surging wave of regionalism, 
researchers developed the theory of dynamic effects (Balassa 1961, Kreinin 1964, Motta 
and Norman 1996, et al.). Dynamic effects include the various ways through which the 
participating countries could improve their total factor productivity and economic growth 
rates, for example, technology transfer, competition, capital flow, and economic reform. 
Since the regional economic integration theory has evolved mainly from the developed 
country experiences, Brown (1961), Johnson (1965), El-Agraa (1989), Plummer (1997) 
and other scholars also investigate the feasibility of integration theory in the developing 
country 6amework.
2.2.1. Static Effects
Even before the publication of The Custom Union Issue, an influential book by Jacob 
Viner (1950), custom union was widely accepted as one of the regional economic 
integration formats. The idea was based on the principles of international trade.
Regional economic integration was considered a stepping-stone to globalization, and the 
ultimate goal of free trade could optimize the benefit from comparative advantage, 
division of labor, and economy of scale. In his book, Viner brings up two challenging 
questions: whether custom union would lead to free trade, and whether trade creation
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could outgrow trade diversion. Viner introduces the concepts of trade creation as the 
replacement of the expensive domestic products by cheaper imports horn a partner, and
trade diversion as the replacement of the cheaper initial imports from the outside world 
by more expensive imports from a partner (El-Agraa, 1989). Economists have been 
working on these two questions, but so far there is no consensus conclusion.
Many theoretical discussions attempt to solve the first question, would the custom 
union lead to free trade. The custom union theory emphasizes that similar country size, 
geographical location, and cultural origins are the prerequisites of successful regionalism, 
but the current integration procedure shows many new features. Ethier (1998) compares 
the “new regionalism” since the late 1980s and the “old regionalism” in the 50s and 60s. 
He argues that the current integration connects the big economies with the small ones, 
and the developed countries with less developed nations. For example, Mexico in 
NAFTA, and the Eastern European countries in EU are much smaller economies than the 
U.S. and Germany, respectively. The small members in the regional economic bloc 
usually experience reforms in trade policy, industrial structure, and political system. 
Ethier embeds the above characteristics into a trade model to prove that regional 
economic integration results from the multilateral liberalism, and facilitates and 
strengthens global free trade. Scholars such as Riezman (1985) and Yi (1996) share the 
similar conclusion as that of Ethier, though they take different approaches. On the other 
hand, some researchers argue that the rising regional economic integration in Europe, 
America and Asia would hinder world free trade. McLaren (2002) interprets the 
regionalism as a coordination failure. If a regional trade bloc is formed, member 
countries would invest within the group, and become more specialized toward each other.
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However, the non-bloc nations would be isolated, and the demand for multilateral free 
trade would diminish.
Calculating the trade creation and trade diversion effects has been a challenging task. 
Kreinin and Plummer (1992) adopt the commodity matching method to assess the 
impacts of NAFTA, the enlargement of EC, and the Single Market Program in Europe 
(EC-92) on ASEAN and South Korea. They estimate that with the tariff removal effect 
only, the trade diversions of ASEAN exports to North American and Europe are 4% and 
8%, respectively, and those of South Korea are 5% in both cases. Six years later, Kreinin 
and Plummer re-investigate the question and study the ex post effects of EC-92 on the 
exports of ASEAN and China. With the import growth approach and gravity model, the 
authors conclude that EC-92 has had negative effects on the exports of ASEAN and 
China, especially in light manufacturing and some electrical machinery industries. 
Hufbauer and Schott (1992) strengthen Kreinin and Plummer’s studies by arguing that 
NAFTA may reduce the exports from other Latin American except Mexico in industries 
such as apparel and agriculture.
2.2.2. Dynamic Effects
Dynamic effects could be summarized into several categories: regional economic 
integration increases the market size, thus firms and industries could benefit from 
economies of scale. The expansion of markets within the region would attract more 
foreign direct investment (EDI) or other forms of capital inflow; the improved capital 
mobility could lead to a boom in infrastructure investment, and prohibit the ffee-ride 
attempt on the public goods of the neighbor countries. Integration not only stimulates the 
trade in goods, but also the transfer of technology and the flow of ideas. When foreign
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firms exploit the easier access in the region, domestic firms are forced to lower costs and 
enhance competition. Last but not least, integration could also increase the institutional 
harmonization and regional political stability, and facilitate the economic reform.
The theoretical analyses of trade creation and trade diversion are well established, but 
the dynamic effects are hard to capture with a single model because of the series of 
separated phenomena (Brada and Mendez, 1988). As a result, researchers have been 
focusing on one or two specific factors of the dynamic effects, and discuss the pros and 
cons of the impacts of regional economic integration.
For example, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) demonstrate that in a world with two 
similar developed economies, integration would induce the flow of ideas, which is 
central to economic growth. The authors consider two models with different 
specifications of the research and development sectors, and they believe that integration 
could encourage the exploitation of economy of scale in the R & D sector, which further 
increases the long run Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. Motta and Norman 
(1996) construct a three-country, three-firm model to investigate the impact of 
integration on FDI. They find that with the larger market size and easier accessibility, 
economic integration more likely leads to the intra-regional export platform FDI, which 
means the investing firms mainly supply the countries in the regional bloc, reduce 
product prices and increase total surplus by intra-regional exports. Scholars also 
investigate other dynamic effects such as integration and competitive discipline (Fung, 
1992), economic reform (Sachs and Warner, 1995), and sunk cost (Owen and Ulph,
2002). There is no doubt that economists have developed good understandings of the
44
impacts of regional economic integration, notwithstanding the fact that the overall 
measurement of the dynamic effects is still pending future research effort.
2.2.3. Regionalism in Less Developed Countries
The theories of regional economic integration are mainly constructed on the 
experiences of developed countries. However, less developed countries possess many 
special characteristics that are not common in the developed nations. Plummer (1997) 
analyzes why the developing countries are special in the real sectors, as well as in 
financial and political systems. For developing countries, in the financial sector, the 
income gap is wider, the financial systems and price mechanism are distorted, financial 
risk and information costs tend to be higher, and the exchange rate regimes are less 
flexible. In the real sector, unemployment rates are higher, and the markets are smaller; 
and politically, developing countries tend to offer less democracy, but more uncertainty. 
Furthermore, less developed nations have lower voice and less power in the international 
organizations. Brown (1961), Robson (1968), Johnson (1965), and El-Agraa (1989) 
investigate the feasibility of adopting the integration theories for the less developed 
countries. Their considerations are based on the following three aspects: trade creation 
and trade diversion, terms of trade, and the dynamic effects. They believe that even if 
developing and developed countries have different structures, the benefits of regionalism 
have even bigger scope for less developed nations. However, the differences should be 
emphasized and justified.
2.3. History of Regional Economic Integration
In a broad sense, regional economic integration has been prevalent since the early 
19*^  century. The first industrial revolution empowered the Western European countries
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with military abilities to conquest the primitive societies in Africa, Asian, and America. 
The technology breakthrough in transportation, communication, and medication 
facilitated the European settlement and investment in the colonies. Meanwhile, the gold 
and silver standards were widely adopted, and the Napoleonic Code became the 
foundation of many of the international legal institutions (Sachs and Warner, 1995). The 
network of preferential trade arrangements and bilateral treaties between colonial 
empires and independent countries played a crucial role in promoting exports and the 
overall economic growth in the developing world.
World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930s severely interrupted the 
economic integration process. Not only in the developing nations, but also in the U.S. 
and European countries, protectionism characterized the government policies and 
academic arguments. For example, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act in 1930 brought the 
highest protective level in the history of the U.S. After President Hoover signed the act, 
the U.S. foreign trade suffered a sharp decline, and the depression intensified. Moreover, 
the act brought retaliatory tariff acts 6om other countries such as the British Abnormal 
Importations Act implemented in 1931. Many countries abandoned currency 
convertibility and started to impose tariff and non-tariff trade barrier. Even Keynes, the 
great economist, wrote in his 1933 lecture Nhhonnf "I sympathize,
therefore, with those who would minimize, rather than with those who would maximize, 
economic entanglements between nations... Let goods be homespun whenever it is 
reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national.” 
The Second World War marked the utter collapse of the international economic systems. 
It is the Marshall Plan aid program which re-introduced the spirit of cooperation in
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Europe, and with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the rising of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) was established in 1957 (Kondonassis, 2001 a). The EEC has induced and 
preceded numerous forms of regional economic integration, and it has been the most 
significant one over the years.
Following the establishment of the EEC, the European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA) was formed in 1960 with seven members: the U.K., Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. The U.K. was the most enthusiastic advocate of the 
EFT A since it wasn’t ready to commit itself to the EEC, which adopted a common 
agriculture policy and aimed at the political unity of the Western Europe. Instead, the 
U.K. preferred to have free trade in the industrial sectors only in order to keep the 
advantage of Commonwealth preference, meanwhile open up the European market for its 
industrial products (El-Agraa, 1989). However, the U.K. and Denmark joined the EEC 
in 1973, and left the EFT A with only relatively smaller economies.
In the developing world, there are many themes of regional economic integration.
For example, in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States was 
established in 1975, the Southern African Customs Union was formed in 1969, and the 
Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes was created in 1976. In Latin 
America, the Central American Common Market was formed in 1960, and in the same 
year, the Latin American Free Trade Association was established. The Andean Group 
and Caribbean Community were formed in the late 60s and early 70s, respectively. In 
Asia, the Association of South-East Asian Nations was founded in 1967, and in East
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Europe, the communist countries formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 
1949.
With the exception of EEC, most of the regional economic integration initiatives of 
the 50s and 60s experienced uneven and inconsistent development process, and some of
them amounted to nothing or even ended in the 70s and early 80s. However, since the 
late 80s, there has been a new wave of regional cooperation and integration. The EEC 
enlarged from the original six members into fifteen, and ten former communist nations in 
the central or Eastern Europe have been invited to join in 2004. The prominent regional 
schemes include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formed by the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico in 1994, the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) signed 
by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) founded in 1989. APEC has become a community with twenty-one 
diverse countries in the Asia-Pacific region accounting for half of the global GNP, over 
50% of the merchandise trade, and two-fifths of the world population (Gershman, 1998). 
Currently, there are more than one hundred regional arrangements in the world.
2.4. Experiences from the Previous Regional Integration Schemes
History indicates that “the world is a roller coaster, in which we all go up and down 
together; or at least down" (Streeten, 1989). The tragedy of September 1 and the war 
on Iraq warn the regional organizations and institutions to take more responsibilities. In 
addition to the traditional economic prosperity and political stability, religious tolerance, 
culture fusion, and policy reform also become the prerequisites of future economic 
development. Regionalism has been facilitating cooperation and improving economic
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growth from many dimensions, and the lessons and experiences from the previous 
integration scheme would provide better understanding of how the mechanism works.
Kondonassis and Malliaris (1996) have an excellent summary of the old lessons from 
Customs Union, which is the most common format of regionalism. They argue that in 
order to take advantage of the division of labor and economy of scale, the bigger the size 
of the integration project, the better the chance to enlarge market and reduce trade 
diversion; the increased market size and reduced tariff among member countries could 
intensify competition and improve economic efficiency; and the initial high tariff level 
usually guarantees the stronger impacts of trade creation than that of trade diversion.
Regional integration couldn’t be achieved overnight; instead, it requires foresight, 
determination, and consistent effort from all the participating nations. The EU has been 
one of the most successful integration schemes. The circulation of Euro in 2002 
indicates years of culmination of macroeconomic convergence, fiscal and monetary 
integration, institutional building, and regulatory harmonization (Arroyo, 2002). 
Politically, "(through EEC), a reconciliation between France and Germany has been 
acliieved ending the conflicts which had led to wars in Europe every few decades 
(Kondonassis, 2001)." Indeed, forty-six years after signing the Treaty of Rome, the EU 
has become an important force to maintain peace in Europe and in the world.
Economic integration is accompanied by the flow of ideology and philosophy. For 
example, Canada, Mexico and the U.S. launched the integration framework NAFTA in 
1994. In spite of the temporary setback in agriculture sectors, Mexico has been making 
steady progress in improving infrastructure, tackling poverty, and building a modem 
society. Furthermore, the spirit of freedom and democracy has never been deeper and
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stronger. In 2000, Vicente Fox, a former Coca-Cola executive, was elected the president 
of Mexico, m arking the first democratic transition of power in Mexico's history.
2.5. Problems and Prospects of Regionalism in East Asia
2.5.1. Problems and Concerns
East Asia consists of eleven countries and regions with tremendous differences in 
size, linguistics, religion, the average national income, and the development stage. China 
has a population of 1.3 billion, which counts for more than 68% of the total population in 
East Asia. Japan and the four newly industrialized economies (NIE): Hong Kong 
(China), Singapore, Taiwan (China), and the Republic of Korea eiyoy high income level 
and living standard; Malaysia, China, Philippines, and Thailand are in the middle income 
category; while Indonesia and Vietnam belong to the low income group®. Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 present the comparison of population and Gross National Product (GNP) of the 
eleven regions in 1999, respectively.
Figure 2.1
East Asia Population in 1999
Q China
■ Hong Kong, China
□ Indonesia
□ Japan
#  Korea, Rep.
Q Malaysia
■ Philippines
□ Singapore 
m Taiwan
H Thailand 
O Vietnam
The classification is based on the World Bank data and statistics. More information is available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/conntryclass/cla3sgronps.htm
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Figure 2.2
East Asia Gross National Product in 1999
0  China
■ Hong Kong, China 
O  Indonesia
□ Japan
m Korea, Rep.
Q Malaysia
■ Philippines
□ Singapore 
m Taiwan
m Thailand
□ Vietnam
Data Source o f Figure 2.1 and 2.2:
Taiwan population data is from the Austrian National University International Economic Data Bank,
GNP data is from the National Statistics o f Taiwan. The rest o f the data is based on the World Bank
Development Indicator, 2001.
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 partly explain why till the early 90s, the East Asia economic 
integration had been nothing but remote possibilities. Many economists believe that the 
geographical proximity and the similarity in development process are the fundamental 
elements of a successful regional arrangement. However, in East Asia, Japan alone 
provides more than 60% of the total production, and China shares almost 70% of the 
population.
Some of the major concerns of the economic integration in East Asia include (1) 
whether China, with its abundant low cost labor and natural resources, would threaten the 
neighboring less developed nations—a phenomena called "big hsh eats small fish"; (2) 
how could developing countries protect their infant industries from the impact of 
Japanese imports; and (3) whether integration would increase the possibility of financial 
contagion and crisis. Political factors also influence the integration process: after the 
Second World War, China, the former Soviet Union, North Korea and Vietnam had been
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in the communist coalitions, but J^an and NIE had close relationships with the U.S. and
the Western European countries. It may be true that most of the political tensions had 
been released after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, but there are still unsolved 
issues between China and Taiwan, and emotional difficulties among people in Republic 
of Korea and China toward Japanese because of the invasion during the World War II.
2.5.2. Prospects and Potentials
Notwithstanding the challenges, there are tremendous potentials and bright prospects 
for East Asia economic integration.
Economically, the eleven East Asia countries could be grouped into three categories. 
The leading role is played by Japan, followed by the NIE group, and the third category 
consists of the five ASEAN countries and China. The three-layer development structure 
facilitates the trade, capital, and technology flow not only from Japan to the second and 
third layers, but also from the second category to the rest of the middle or low income 
economies. The trade relationships among the three categories are more of complement 
rather than substitute features. The “flying geese” development pattern partly explains 
the East Asia growth miracle in the past twenty years.
Table 2.1 shows the export and import directions of the East Asia countries in 1991 
and 2000. In 1991, the export total in East Asia is 795,238 million dollars, and by 2000, 
it increases by more than 110% to 1,670,296 million dollars. The import is also more 
than doubled, reaching 1,460,307 million dollars in 2000.
52
Table 2.1: Export & Import Destinations of East Asia Countries in 1991 & 2000
China Japan
Export
91
Export
GO
Import
91
Import
00
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
World (Million US$) 71910 249297 63791 206132 314786 479249 236999 379511
China % 2.7 6.3 6 14.5
Japan % 14.3 16.7 15.7 20.1
NIE%(1) 51.4 26.7 36.5 30.7 21.3 23.9 11.5 12.3
ASEAN % (2) 3 4.4 4.3 8.2 8.1 9.9 11.6 13.5
East Asia Total % 68.6 47.8 56.6 59 32.1 40.1 29.2 40.3
US% 8.6 20.9 12.6 10.9 29.3 30 22.6 19.1
EU % (3) 9.9 15.3 14.6 15 20.4 16.4 14.5 12.3
Hong Kong Korea
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
World (Million US$) 98577 201860 100255 212805 71870 172268 81525 160481
China % 27.1 34.6 37.7 43.1 1.4 10.7 4.2 8
Japan % 5.4 5.5 16.4 12 17.2 11.9 25.9 15
NIE% 8.9 6.8 18.1 16.9 12.6 14.2 4.1 6
ASEAN % 3.8 3.5 3.8 5.9 6.4 8.2 5.9 8.7
East Asia Total % 45.2 50.4 76 77.9 37.6 44.9 40.1 37.7
US% 22.7 23.3 7.6 6.8 25.9 21.9 23.2 18.2
EU% 18.8 15.2 9.7 8.7 14.7 13.6 13.1 9.8
Singapore Taitvan (4)
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
World (Million US$) 59025 137804 66293 134545 76195 148122 63293 140010
China % 1.5 3.9 3.4 5.3
Japan % 8.7 7.5 21.3 13.8
NIE% 13.1 17.4 9.9 10.6
ASEAN % 22.3 26.4 18.9 24.4
East Asia Total % 45.6 55.2 53.5 54.1 28.9 40.6 15.7 28.6
US% 19.8 17.3 15.8 14.1
EU% 14.7 13.2 13 11.3 17.4 15 13.4 11.2
Indonesia Malaysia
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
World (Million US$) 29142 62124 25869 33515 34349 98135 36648 82199
China % 4.1 4.5 3.2 6 1.9 3.1 2.2 3.9
Japan % 36.9 23.2 24.5 16.1 15.9 13 26.1 21.1
NIE% 21 23.8 18.2 22.3 33.8 30 26 27.1
ASEAN % 3.2 6.7 3.3 7.9 5.6 7.6 4.4 9.6
East Asia Total % 65.2 58.2 49.1 52.4 57.2 53.7 58.8 61.8
US% 12 13.7 13.1 8.5 16.9 20.5 15.4 16.6
EU% 13.1 14 20 12.4 15.2 13.7 15.3 10.8
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Table 2.1: Export & Import Destinations of East Asia Countries in 1991 & 2000 (Con.)
Thailaad (5)
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
Export
91
Export
00
Import
91
Import
00
World (Million US$) 8767 39783 12786 33808 28428 69057 37591 61924
China % 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 1.2 4.1 3.1 2.8
Japan % 20.2 14.1 19.7 17.8 18.1 14.8 29.4 23.8
NIE% 12.1 22.8 20.2 22.6 16.2 18.9 19 21.6
ASEAN % 4.6 7.1 5.7 8.4 3.6 8.8 4.3 9.4
East Asia Total % 38.4 45.7 47.5 51.1 39.1 46.6 55.8 57.7
US% 35.9 28.7 20.4 15.8 21.3 21.3 10.6 10.7
EU% 19.2 17.2 10.9 8.8 22.7 15.7 16.5 10
Vietnam (6)
Export Export Import Import
91 00 91 00
World (Million US$) 2189 12597 2483 15377
China % 0.9 6.7 0.7 11
Japan % 32.8 19 6.4 14.1
NIE% 34.6 13.3 45.4 42.8
ASEAN % 4.1 9 3.2 12.5
East Asia Total % 72.4 48.1 55.7 80.5
US% 0 6.2 0 2.5
EU% 5.5 26.7 12.3 8.3
Data Source: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997 and 2001.
(1). NIE include Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
(2). ASEAN include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
(3). European Union (EU) include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
(4). There is only limited data for Taiwan in the IMF Yearbook and other data sources.
(5). In the case o f Thailand, the data o f export to and import from Taiwan in 2000 is not available, thus it is 
substituted by 1999 data.
(6). In the case o f  Vietnam, the 1991 world export and import volume is the DOTS instead of IPS value 
because o f the data limitation.
The intra-regional trade shares of most of the East Asia countries are more than half
of their total trade values. For example, 16.7% of China’s export goes to Japan in 2000, 
and another 26.7% goes to the four NIE—Hong Kong, Korea, Sing^ore, and Taiwan; 
the total export directed to the East Asia area is 11.6% higher than that of the 
combination of the U.S. and the EU. Meanwhile, 59% of the Chinese import comes from
countries in this region. In Japan, both the regional export and import increased about
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10% fmm 1991 to 2000. As of 2000, East Asia absorbed 40.1% of Japan's export and
provided 40.3% of the import.
Hong Kong and Singapore show stronger dependence on the intra-regional trading 
relationship compared with that of Repubhc of Korea and Taiwan. The former two NIE 
share 45.2% to 77.9% of their trade in this region compared with those of 15.7% to 
44.9% in the latter two. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are 
also closely related to the intra-regional trade partners. In 2000, the intra-regional trade 
of each of the five ASEAN counts about at least half of the total trade value. But 
interestingly enough, all the five nations heavily rely on Japan and the NIE, and the 
trading volumes with China or the other ASEAN stay in single digit levels.
East Asia is dominated by less developed countries, and macroeconomic stability has 
been a critical and fundamental requirement for the future success of development 
strategy. Indeed, “even short term bouts of instability can haunt an economy for many 
years,” many East Asia economies are still dealing with the aftermath of the 1997 
financial crisis (Plummer, 1997). Regional economic integration could support stable 
macroeconomic policies in several ways. First, integration agreement requires the 
exchange rate stability and low inflation to sustain its proper function; second, members 
must share information, encourage stable fiscal and monetary polices, and participate in 
“peer pressure” to reduce unstable polices; third, intellectual property and environment 
are usually better protected by the regional cooperation, which will further facilitate 
technology transfer and increase foreign direct investment; last but not least, regionalism 
encourages the domestic policy reforms of its member states and improves the 
international attention and recognition of the whole region.
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Politically, the East Asian region has never been in a better era of cooperation and 
interdependence. After the World n, the former Soviet Union and the U.S. had been the
leaders of the communism and capitalism coalition. The economic and culture 
communication was frozen between the two superpowers, and the armaments were 
heavily placed around the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, most of the East Asia 
countries also took a hard line stance (Jeong & Choe, 2001). Gorbachev’s political 
reform and the transformation of the former Soviet Union turn the regional interrelations 
into a whole new page. Republic of Korea and China established diplomatic relations in 
1992, and the “Sunshine Policy” brought the presidents of the two Koreas together in 
2000. Meanwhile, the peaceful return of Hong Kong in 1997, the deepening of the 
market economy reform, and the successful WTO access in 2001 all indicate China’s 
commitment to keep peace, to pursue development, and to follow international rules and 
orders.
However, the ever-changing world never stops challenging human beings with more 
dilemmas. The terrorist attack has rung the alarm of the importance of mutual 
understanding between different cultures and religions. East Asia consists of 
complicated religious and ethnic groups. For instance, 87% and 60 % of the population
are Muslin in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, followed by various other groups 
such as Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu. In addition. President Bush’s declaration of 
North Korea as one of the “Axes of Evil” in his State of the Nation address, and North 
Korea’s admittance of the possession of nuclear weapons further deteriorate the already 
vulnerable international stability. Joseph Nye, dean of the Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government argues that in this information age, the worst strategy to fight terrorism is to
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isolate people in the unfriendly regions from the rest of the World. If the confliction 
between the U.S. and North Korea could be investigated in a bigger framework, the 
concern of'^unintended consequences" could be effectively reduced or eliminated. East
Asia is certainly in a pivotal position to advocate mutual understanding and cooperation.
2.6. Regional Integration Process in East Asia
Regionalism in East Asia is still in the preliminary stage. The important steps taken 
by the eleven countries are the active participation of APEC, the inauguration of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the bilateral trade negotiations among some 
member states.
APEC was created in 1989 as a means of economic dialogue, but it has grown into a 
forum for ensuring and facilitating trade and investment liberalization, and for improving 
development cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. There are twelve original members; 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Thailand and United States. China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan joined APEC in 1991, followed by Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 
1993, Chile in 1994, and Peru, Russia, and Vietnam in 1998. Currently, APEC includes 
twenty-one members with a population of over 2.5 billion and a combined GDP of 19 
trillion US dollars, which account for 47 percent of world t r a d e ' I t s  sheer size and the 
membership composition have made APEC a rising star in the international arena.
The principle of APEC is to have the sub-regional trading arrangements consistent 
with the WTO rules, thus by participating APEC, the member states would increase the 
confidence in multilateral liberalization and reduce concerns about being excluded from 
the preferential approaches. Even if  both the voluntary characteristic of APEC and the
The statistics is from the APEC website at http://www.apecsec.org.sg
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di versity of the member economies contribute to the slow and difficult liberalization 
process, the reinforcement of economic reform in developing countries and the dynamic 
effects such as technology transfer from DCs to LDCs promise the bright aspects of the 
Asia-Pacihc economic integration (Plummer 1997). APEC's economic focus has been
broadened to security issues after the terrorist attack on September 11 ,^ 2001, and the 
health care cooperation because of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS).
Since its inception in 1991, China has been actively taking part in various APEC 
activities and played an important role in forming the cooperation policies and strategies. 
Meanwhile, APEC has provided China an opportunity to demonstrate its determination 
on continuing domestic economic reform, on integrating with the rest of the world, and 
on promoting regional prosperity.
In 2002, China is the 6* largest trading nation with more than 50% of its export to 
and import from its East Asia neighbors. Some researchers believe that even if China is 
the most tempting market in the world, it poses a threat to the rest of the East Asia 
countries with its abundant natural resources and low cost labor, therefore, other less 
developed countries in this region should reduce the dependency on China (Park, 1996). 
Contrary to the above argument, we believe that the relationships between China and the 
other East Asia economies are more complimentary than competing: Japan and NIE 
provide China with capital, technology, advanced management philosophy, and export 
markets, while China contributes its abundant low cost labor and natural resources.
China also creates a deeper and more intensive horizontal division of labor in East Asia 
area. For instance, Taiwan shifted many of the declining industries into mainland China
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to extend the product life cycle; Hong Kong also took advantage of the language and 
ethnic affinity with China, and became a key beneficiary of the intensive economic 
integration with China. Table 2.2 indicates that in 1999, NIE alone contributes 56.74% 
of the capital inflow in China, who has been one of the biggest recipients of foreign 
direct investment in the world. Though China and the ASEAN compete in some hght 
manufacturing sectors, they also complement each other with primary or raw materials.
Due to the different political systems, rules of law and social structures, China and 
some of the other East Asia countries have been criticized for invading the intellectual 
property right and human right. APEC has become a forum for China and its alliances to 
pursue understanding and support, and to solve those problems.
APEC and WTO are mutually reinforcing in facilitating trade liberalization (Yang 
and Huang, 1999). APEC is based on consensus and peer group pressure to recognize 
the diversity of economies and legitimize mutual interdependence, while WTO imposes 
legal rules and regulations, which provide better security for members’ market access, 
and further encourages market opening and enhance policy coordination.
Table 2.2: Major Foreign Direct Investment Participants in China in 1999
Country/Region FDI Outflow  
(USSlOOmillion)
Investment in China 
fUSSlOOmllUon)
Share in China%
Japan 227.43 29.73 7.37
Hong Kong 198.95 163.63 40.58
Singapore 39.43 26.42 6.55
Taiwan 44.20 25.99 6.45
Korea 25.48 12.75 3.16
NIE Total 308.06 228.79 56.74
US 1509.01 42.16 10.46
Data Sources: the World Investment Report o f the UN & the Foreign Trade Statistics o f Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.
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The WTO access in November 2001 is China's milestone for trade and economic 
development, and it offers China the chance to play even more important role in the 
world and regional economy.
The impacts of China's WTO membership to other developing countries include: (1) 
the expansion of Chinese export market; (2) increased supply of export into international 
markets; (3) stronger competition in the third markets, and (4) bigger volume of inward 
and outward foreign direct investment to and from China (Martin, Bhattasali, and Li
2003). It is true that China will bring stronger competitions in the third market in 
apparel, textiles, and electronic industries, which require more regional cooperation to 
resolve the challenge. On the other hand, China’s liheralization in agriculture and 
service industry will considerably increase the demand for raw material, natural 
resources, and services such as telecommunication, finance and insurance. China is 
expected to import more from other East Asia countries, and to provide this region with 
cheaper intermediate products. In general, China brings in more opportunities rather than 
threats to the rest of the East Asia region.
In 2001, China proposed a new free trade area covering the ASEAN and China. A 
year later, with the inauguration of the Asia Free Trade Area (AFTA), the intra-ASEAN 
tariff rates have been lowered to 5%, and the reduction applies to 90% of products. The 
goal is to reach zero tariff rates within AFTA by 2010. The original AFTA members 
include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, while Vietnam is 
expected to join in 2006 and reach zero tariff rates by 2015.
Beside the above preferential trading agreements, some East Asia countries also 
proposed bilateral trade arrangements and started the negotiations. For instance,
6 0
Singapore and Japan passed an agreement encompassing facilitation and service sector 
issues in 1999; Republic of Korea and Japan established the "Japan-Korea Economic 
Agenda 21" and "South Korea-Japan IT Cooperation" initiatives in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively.
The integration and development strategies are aimed at promoting cross border trade 
flow, maintaining stability, and pursing sustainable long run economic growth.
However, in order for them to succeed, East Asia countries need to separate economics 
and politics at the beginning stage. Furthermore, adequate mechanisms need to be created 
for reducing inter and intra country income disparity, building welfare and pension 
systems, protecting intellectual property rights, and introducing harmonized rules and 
standards.
2.7. Concluding Remarks
“Regionalism rules (Ethier, 1998).” Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new 
wave of regional economic integration has swept the globe: 6om A&ica to North 
America, from Asia to Central America, and from Europe to Oceania, there are many 
regional initiatives and attempts. However, regional integration is not a new 
phenomenon; it once prevailed in the 19* century when the European civilization started 
to build the colony empires and in the 1950s after the World War n.
This chapter reviews the history of regional economic integration, and discusses the 
theoretical underpinning of the integration process. Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1960) set 
the foundation of theories of trade creation and diversion, but due to the difficulties in 
empirically testing the static effects, the dynamic effects covering various factors such as
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technology transfer, competition, coital flow, and economic reform are also vigorously
investigated.
Based on the experiences from the existing regional integration schemes, this chapter 
argues that there are tremendous potentials and bright prospects for East Asia economic 
integration. Economically, the three development layer characteristic in the eleven East 
Asia countries facilitates trade, capital, and technology flows from developed countries 
to less developed nations, and from the high income regions to the middle and low 
income economies. The intra-regional trade data further demonstrates that the three 
groups of countries are more of complements than substitutes. Politically, the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union opens an era of inter-dependence in East Asian. Other events 
such as the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between China and Republic of 
Korea, the “Sunshine Policy” for the two Koreas, and the peaceful return of Hong Kong 
back to China also indicates that East Asian has never been in a better atmosphere for 
regional cooperation since the Cold War. Meanwhile, East Asia is in a pivotal position 
to advocate mutual understanding and to balance the world power.
All the East Asia countries are members of the APEC; meanwhile, they all belong to 
WTO except Vietnam. Even if regionalism in East Asia is still in the preliminary stage, 
the active participation in APEC and WTO will contribute and promote the economic 
cooperation and political coordination in this region. China has become an important 
force in both the economic and political forums. Contrary to the negative view that 
China threatens the rest of the East Asia developing countries, this chapter argues that 
China’s involvement in regional economic integration not only improves regional 
economic prosperity, but also strengthens political stability.
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Chapter Three
Infrastructure as a Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
3.1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the major forms of international capital 
flow. Due to the sluggish global economy, and the uncertain international political 
environment, the amount of FDI inflows has been decreasing considerably in the major 
developed countries in the past few years. But in contrast, FDI flows to some developing 
nations have grown rapidly. For example, China became the largest FDI recipient in 
2002 with almost 53 billion USD of inflows (OECD, 2003). Though there is no 
consensus on the role of FDI for long run economic growth, most researchers agree that 
for developing countries, with transition economies in particular, FDI has a positive 
impact on economic development since FDI is the amalgamation of stable investment 
funds, advanced technology, efficient managerial skills, and easier access to the world 
market (Chuang and Lin, 1999, Buckley, Clegg and Wang, 2002, Oliva and Rivera- 
Batiz, 2002, etc.).
Many countries see attracting FDI as an important development strategy, and 
extensive studies have been conducted to investigate the determinants of FDI. Lim
(2001) has a detailed summary of the determinants of FDI. Theoretically, the size of the 
host market, agglomeration effect, low labor cost, hscal incentive, hiendly business
climate, and trade openness should have positive impacts on FDI, while high 
transportation cost, bureaucratic red tape, and political instability would repel FDI.
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However, empirical studies indicate that few factors have a consistent significant 
influence on FDI inflows.
This chapter attempts to investigate the role of infrastructure on FDI inflows. We 
define infrastructure as a broad concept including both physical and social perspectives. 
Physical infrastructure provides and delivers the services such as energy, water, 
sanitation, transportation, and communication, which are necessary for daily life (World 
Bank). Social infrastructure is captured by Governance indicators measuring the 
political, institutional and legal environment within which individuals accumulate skills 
and firms produce output (Hall and Jones, 1999, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002 and 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). It is difficult to measure the quality of 
infrastructure development, especially for some developing countries, where data is 
neither available nor accurate. Most of the previous studies choose one of the physical 
infrastructure indicators to represent the rest of the sectors. For example, Cheng and 
Kwan (2000) take on all roads (km/km^ of land mass), high-grade paved roads (km/km^ 
of land mass), and railways (km/km^ of land mass), respectively, as the physical 
infrastructure measurements. However, any single indicator could produce an 
inconsistent or biased result, which could weaken the strength of the argument. We 
implement the principal component analysis to construct a comprehensive infrastructure 
measurement. The different sectors such as energy, transportation, and 
telecommunication all have their own voices in our study.
This chapter also contributes to the literature in some other ways. First, to our 
understanding, this is the first study to expand the concept of infrastructure to both 
physical and social perspectives, and to investigate their impacts on FDI inflows.
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Bougheas, Demetriades, and Mamuneas (2000) argue that the modeling of "soA"
infrastructure such as institutional framework and legal system would yield important 
insights into economic development; however, most researchers only focus on physical 
infrastructure.'^ There are a few exceptions in the literature confirming the close 
relationships between social infrastructure and productivity, FDI, and economic growth, 
but the role of physical infrastructure is not emphasized, or not even mentioned 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Hall and Jones 1999, etc.).
Second, we use the newly published governance indicators to measure social 
infrastructure. The governance indicators are drawn from 25 separate data sources 
constructed by 18 different organizations, and it is the most comprehensive and accurate 
governance infrastructure measurement available for most countries in the world 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003). It includes six aggregate governance clusters 
capturing the political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
the control of corruption, and the process that authorities are selected and replaced. This 
data set covers 199 regions for 4 time periods: 1996,1998,2000, and 2002, and the time 
series feature makes the panel investigation of the role of governance infrastructure 
possible for the first time.
Third, this paper provides both cross section and panel data analyses to study the 
infrastructure determinant on FDI inflows. There are large amount of sample countries 
for both of the ordinary least squares and random effect models. In the panel study, our
"  For example, Fox and Porca (2001) conclude that physical infrastructure such as telecommunication and 
electricity is essential to support and facilitate economic activities in the rural areas. Yilmaz and Dine 
(2002) examine the impact o f telecommunication infrastructure on the service sectors’ output growth in 
different states in the U.S., and their study indicates that the states accruing positive benefits are those that 
efficiently use the telecommunication infrastructure.
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data is 6om 1995 to 2002, which captures the most recent changes in FDI inflows and
infrastructure availabilities.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section II introduces the principal 
component analysis, and builds the comprehensive physical and governance 
infrastructure indexes for a wide range of countries. Section III discusses the 
econometric methodology. Section IV explains the variables and the data source, hr 
section V, we discuss the regression results, and section VI concludes.
3.2. Construction of Infrastructure Index with Principal Component Analysis
3.2.1. Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis is a statistical technique for factor analysis. The 
purpose of this method is to summarize the complex high dimensional data into a few 
dimensions, where each dimension is called a principal component. Each component 
represents a linear combination of the variables. The first principal component accounts 
for as much variation in the data as possible, and the next principal component accounts 
for as much of the variation unexplained by the previous principal components as 
possible. We adopt this technique and build the comprehensive physical and governance 
infrastructure indexes based on the first principal component since it explains about 60% 
of the variance of physical infrastructure and more than 80% of the variance of 
governance infrastructure.
Our physical infrastructure measurements have different scales. For example, the 
energy availability is represented by the amount of electric power consumed by each 
person, while the transportation capacity is indicated by the percentage of paved road 
over total road. In order to eliminate the different scales for the sample countries, we
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assume that each group of physical infrastructure indicators is normally distributed, and 
the raw data is transferred by the standardizing formula. However, the standardization 
process is not necessary for the aggregate governance in&astructure indicators since they 
are constructed with the unobserved components model, and all the values are between -  
3 and +3.
3.2.2. Physical and Governance Infrastructure Measurements
The aspects of physical infrastructure captured by the cross section study and panel
data investigation are slightly different due to data limitation. Appendix 3.1 lists all the 
physical infrastructure measurements. For the cross section data, the measurements 
include factors such as energy, transportation, telecommunication, communication, 
sanitation, and water source. Unfortunately, in order to maintain a legitimate amount of 
sample countries, the sanitation and water source indicators are substituted by the air 
transport and passenger car measurements in the panel data set for the period of 1995 to 
2000. However, even if the infrastructure indicators are reduced to only three in 2001 
and 2002, almost half of the observations do not have the physical infrastructure index 
values.
Governance Infrastructure Indicators cover the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate
and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2003). There are six aggregate governance measurements constructed by the 
unobserved components model: Voice and accountability; Political stability; Government 
effectiveness; Regulatory quality; Rule of law; and Control of corruption.
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Both the cross section and panel studies include 86 countries, but there are slight 
differences in the individual countries in the two data sets because of the data 
availability. The country names are listed in the appendix 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
3.2.3. Infrastructure Index
The eigen values and eigen vectors for the cross section physical infrastructure 
measurements are reported in Table 3.1. Since the first component explains 65% of the 
variance, it is legitimate to adopt the first principal component to represent the combined 
variance of the eight physical infrastructure measurements. Then Factor loading, the 
weight of each infrastructure indicators is derived. Physical Infrastructure Index for the 
cross section study is calculated and ranked in Appendix 3.4.'^ Governance 
Infrastructure Index is also computed and listed in Appendix 3.4.
Table 3.1; PCA of Cross Section Physical Infrastructure Measurements (95-02)
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4
Eigen Value 5.206010 1.197568 0.599760 0.368145
Variance 0.650751 0.149696 0.074970 0.046018
Proportion
Cumulative 0.650751 0.800447 0.875417 0.921435
Proportion
Variable Eigen Eigen Eigen Eigen
Vectors 1 Vector2 Vector3 Vector4
Energy Use 0.394918 -0.235789 -0.004939 0.141873
Electric Power 0.398509 -0.271018 0.026352 0.062626
Health Expenditure 0.379024 -0.314683 0.031142 -0.141564
Paved Roads 0.237807 0.524392 -0.769759 -0.171016
Phone Lines 0.409822 -0.127713 -0.042064 -0.178577
TV Sets 0.387834 -0.082726 -0.163066 0.167810
Sanitation 0.286345 0.520095 0.310776 0.699286
Water Source 0.290959 0.450874 0.529944 -0.614502
Note: Data source: World Development Indicators (2003); the PCA result is computed by Eviews 4.
■ The formula to derive Factor loading is: F actorLoading -  E ig en vec to r  * EigenValue
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The United States scores the highest in physical in&astmcture index, and the top five 
countries are all classiSed as high income OECD nations, while the bottom ten nations
are dominated by African developing economies. In the Governance Infrastructure 
Index, the United States slips to 9^ ,^ and Singapore, an emerging market, is ranked 4*. 
The bottom ten countries in the governance index are some AMcan developing countries,
transition nations in central and east Europe, and Iraq. For developed countries, the 
physical and governance infrastructure ranks are quite balanced, but for some developing 
countries, the comparison between the two indexes is very dramatic. For instance, Iraq is 
ranked 44'*’, and India is listed as 73"* in the physical index, but they drop to 86'*’ and rise 
to 35'*’ in the governance index, respectively.
We follow the PCA procedure for the panel data set to compute the infrastructure 
indexes for each of the 86 countries for four points of time from 1995 to 2002 (the four 
observations are the average of 95-96, 97-98, 99-00, and 01-02). The physical index is 
reported in Appendix 3.5, and the governance index is in Appendix 3.6. There is not 
much change in the inter-country ranks among the four points of time, which indicates 
that it takes time to improve the infrastructure quality and capability. Similar to the cross 
section infrastructure index, developed countries are more stable in terms of their ranks 
over time, and the higher ranks are frlled with the high income OECD countries except 
Qatar in the physical index and Singapore in the governance index. For the developing 
countries, the notable change in the physical index is the upward move of Sri Lanka from 
7F ' in 1996 to 62"'* in 1998 and 2000. In the governance index, the good improvements 
include Romania, from late the 50s to 48'*’ in 2002, and Sri Lanka from the early 60s to
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51®*. On the other side, there is also downward mobility such as Indonesia drops from 
64**’ in 1996 to about 80**’ in 1998, 2000 and 2002.
3.3. Econometric Framework
This chapter adopts two econometric techniques to examine the determinants of 
physical and governance infrastructure on FDI inflows. The Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) study includes 86 countries over the 1995-2002 periods. The random effect panel 
investigation uses data averaged every two years from 1995 to 2002, thus there are four 
observations for each of the 86 sample countries.
3.3.1. OLS Cross Section Analysis
The basic regression equation for the cross section data is
Where the dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI inflows to a country, is the
White heteroskedasticity consistent standard error, and represents the conditional
information set, including the measurements of real income, government expenditure, 
education indicator, trade openness, tax rate, population, and exchange rate.
3.3.2. Random Effect Panel Model
The panel data provides some major advantages over the simple cross section or time 
series data. First, the panel data increases the degree of freedom and reduces the 
collinearity among the independent variables, which further improves the efficiency of 
the econometric analysis (Hsiao, 2003). Second, the panel procedure exploits the 
dynamic changes over time. Third, compared with the OLS model, the panel 
investigation could reduce or eliminate the biased results from the unobserved country 
specific effect.
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This chuter adopts the random effect model based on the fact that the 86 countries in
this study are chosen purely because of data availability. We do not make any inferences 
conditional on certain effects such as income level or development stage that are in the 
sample, instead, we make unconditional inferences with respect to the population of all
effects (Hsiao, 2003). The model is in the form of
Ln(FDIInfloWii) = fi^Physicalljfrastructire.^ + fi^Governancdnfrastrudure^^ +
The conditional information setW^ includes income level, government consumption, 
primary school enrollment ratio, total population, and trade openness indicators. The 
error term fj..^  is the combination of a common constant a  and a cross section specific
variable g, that is uncorrelated with the residual y., ; the relationship could also be 
summarized by the mathematical presentation
3.4. Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this research are from three major sources. The dependent variable 
measuring FDI inflows is from the United Nation Conference of Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) data set (2003). The governance infrastructure index is computed from the 
governance indicators constructed by Kaufrnann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). The
physical infrastructure index and the explanatory variables in the conditional information 
set are from the World Bank publication, World Development Indicator (2003).
Our choice of the control variables in the information set is based on the previous 
literature. Personal income standard is measured by GDP per capita in constant 1995 
USD; human capital level is captured by the primary school enrollment; government 
consumption is calculated as the final expenditure over GDP; the openness of the
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econorny is represented by total trade as the percentage of GDP, and the potential market 
size is indicated by total population. We also include the highest marginal corporate tax 
rate and the real effective exchange rate in the cross section study; however, they are not 
available in the panel study in order to reduce the amount of missing variables.
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics and correlation matrix using the cross section 
data averaged from 1995 to 2002. We could see the considerable variation 6om the 
summary statistics. For example, the mean FDI inflow is 5471.678 million USD, and the 
standard deviation is 19003.51. The United States receives the highest amount of FDI
inflows, an average of 149056.2 million USD in the eight year period, followed by the 
United Kingdom and China with 56689.75 and 43081.75 million, respectively. The 
second highest FDI recipient in the developing world is Brazil, hosting about half of the 
amount in China. Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Gabon are the four countries with negative 
FDI flows in our sample, and Gabon has the minimum value o f-310.25 million.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix
FDI Physical Governance GDP per Primary Government Popu
Inflow Index Index Capita School Consumption Trade lation
Mean 5471.678 0.07804 -0.35265 4719.314 98.95364 13.976 72.128 60591648
Maximum 149056.2 17.70036 10.36083 31503.22 149.6948 26.613 190.32 1.25E+09
Minimum -310.25 -8.494916 -8.06423 112.9047 49.524 4.5421 20.107 387000
Std. Dev. 19003.51 5.301111 4.469123 8081.803 16.11269 4.8929 30.943 1.80E-M)8
Log(FDI Physical Governance Log(GDP Primary Government Log(Popu
Inflow) Index Index Capita) School Consumption Trade Lation)
Log(FDI) 1
Phy Index 0.619079 1
Gov Index 0.65438 0.817061 1
Log(GDP) 0.661059 0.866372 0.863803 1
P school 0.360544 0.210583 0.26348 0.409264 1
Gov Con 0.282581 0.544632 0.46398 0.463834 0.063084 1
Trade -0.12274 0.188362 0.146857 0.126821 0.071304 0.3248 1
Log(Popu) 0.435876 -0.127345 -0.13784 -0.15944 -0.02231 -0.155 -0.545 1
Note: In the correlation matrix, FDI inflow, GDP per capita and Population are in the logarithm format.
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The correlation matrix suggests that FDI inflows are closely related to physical and
governance infrastructure and per capita income: the correlation coefficients are equal to
0.62,0.65, and 0.66. The inAastructure index is highly correlated with income level 
having a coefAcient value of 0.86, but it is negatively associated with population size.
Trade openness is positively correlated with all the variables except FDI inflows, and 
interestingly enough, population is on the opposite side of trade openness, negatively
correlated with any of the measures except FDI inflows.
3.5. Empirical Results
This chapter evaluates the impacts of physical infrastructure and governance 
infrastructure on FDI inflows with the OLS procedure and the random effect model. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI inflows, and we test the determinant of 
infrastructure with different combinations of a group of explanatory variables.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the cross section study. We report six estimations with 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The first column represents the simplest 
regression equation and the sixth column reports the most complicated equation given 
the data available. Both Physical and Governance infrastructures are positively 
correlated with FDI inflows. Half of the Governance Infrastructure coefficients are 
significant at the conventional statistic level; however, those of Physical Infrastructure 
are overwhelmingly insignificant. Govermnent expenditure, exchange rate, and 
corporate tax rate have negative impacts on FDI though the impacts are not significant. 
Trade openness, income level and population in the host country all have positive 
coefficients, but only those of primary school enrollment and population are significant 
in most of the equations.
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The cross section result conjGrms our hypothesis that in6astructure plays an 
important role in attracting FDI. Furthermore, it suggests that potential market size and 
human capital level are the two most important fiactors among various indices that have 
positive relationships with FDI.
Table 3.3: Cross Section Results of the Determinants of FDI Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical
Infrastructure
0.100656
(0.0807)
0.057894
(0.4041)
0.083228
(0.2342)
0.085525
(0.2208)
0.048661
(0.2730)
0.081977
(0.2523)
Governance
Infrastructure
0.169778
(0.0093)
0.098578
(0.1879)
0.113290
(0.1571)
0.151864
(0.0471)
0.145434
(0.0235)
0.147266
(0.1346)
Logarithm of 
GDP Per Capita
0.420008
(0.1555)
0.200111
(0.5594)
0.175877
(0.5725)
0.424184
(0.1142)
0.250581
(0.6062)
Primary School 
Enrollment
0.023475
(0.1280)
0.022681
(0.1243)
0.017013
(0.0996)
0.039043
(0.0371)
Government
Expenditure
-0.02976
(0.4016)
-0.01157
(0.6895)
-0.036790
(0.5067)
Trade
Openness
0.005586
(0.2125)
0.009385
(0.2065)
Logarithm of 
Population
0.786930
(0.0000)
0.923567
(0.0000)
Corporate 
Tax Rate
-0.034273
(0.2770)
Exchange
Rate
-0.011197
(0.7544)
Constant 6.442976
(0.0000)
3.320465
(0.1283)
2.662293
(0.1957)
3.338462
(0.1233)
-11.6876
(0.0001)
-12.48636
(0.0976)
Ac^usted R^ 0.3996 0.412517 0.432210 0.472927 0.764276 0.774914
N 82 79 79 77 76 34
Note: P value is in the parenthesis; the covariance is white heteroskedasticity consistent.
Data is from W D I (2003), UNCTAD (2003), Kaufmann etc. (2003), and author’s calculation.
Table 3.4 reports a set of random effect panel investigations, where the infrastructure 
index is estimated with different combinations of conditional information variables. The 
first column assesses the relationship between FDI and infrastructure, a common 
constant, and individual country effect. Both physical and governance infrastructures 
have a positive impact on FDI, but only the governance infrastructure coefficient is
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signiûcant at the conventional level. Column 2 suggests that with one more explanatory 
variable, the logarithm of GDP per c^ita measuring income level, the governance
infrastructure is still positively and significantly associated with FDI inflows. The 
regression result also indicates that with a 1% improvement in social infrastructure, there 
wül be a 0.15% increase in FDI. However, the coefBcient of physical in&astructure
changes to be negative, though it is not significant. Column 1 and 2 represent the basic 
regression analyses with data covering four points of time— 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 
1999-2000, and 2001-2002. For the rest of the studies, the fourth observation for each 
country is omitted because of the missing data. Thus the number of observations in the 
first two columns is around 290, while those in the other four columns are from 219 to 
231.
Table 3.4; Random Effect Panel Study of the Determinants of FDI Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical
In&astructure
0.013517
(0.6862)
-0.03627
(0.3953)
-0.05476
(0.4921)
0.041222
(0.4410)
-0.00046
(0.9952)
0.003690
(0.9478)
Governance
Infrastructure
0.239005
(0.0000)
0.149545
(0.0039)
0.124282
(0.0339)
0.196065
(0.0001)
0.145192
(0.0123)
0.152561
(0.0010)
Logarithm of 
GDP Per Capita
0.536851
(0.0126)
0.466846
(0.0724)
0.313356
(0.2114)
0.447728
(0.0180)
Primary School 
Enrollment
0.042191
(0.0000)
0.037965
(0.0000)
0.038952
(0.0000)
0.033084
(0.0000)
Government
Expenditure
-0.02306
(0.0007)
-0.02359
(0.0008)
-0.02246
(0.0008)
Trade
Openness
6.04E-10
(0.6954)
4.82E-10
(0.7537)
-6.15E-10
(0.6782)
Logarithm of 
Population
0.694952
(0.0000)
Adjusted R^ 0.882255 0.881148 0.881856 0.885493 0.886666 0.892775
N 296 281 231 229 219 219
Note: P value is in the parenthesis.
Data is froniW DI (2003), UNCTAD (2003), Kaufmann etc. (2003), and author’s calculation.
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Column 3 investigates the impact of school enrollment on FDI inflows, while column 
5 includes two more independent variables based on the third estimation: government 
expenditure and trade openness. Column 3 and 5 share similar findings that governance 
infi-astructure and school enrollment are positively correlated with the dependent variable 
at 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Physical infiastructure has a negative 
but insignificant impact on FDI, which is contrary to the performance of trade openness 
and GDP per capita, with positive and insignificant coefficients.
Column 4 and 6 assess the role of infrastructure given other explanatory indices.
The regression coefficients of infrastructure indicators are all positive, but those of the 
physical index are not significant; however, the governance infrastructures are significant 
at a 99% confidence level. The rest of the variables have consistent results with that of 
other regression equations, and the logarithm of population has a positive and significant 
impact on FDI.
The cross section study and panel data examinations indicate that governance 
infrastructure has a consistent positive and significant impact on FDI inflows, while the 
relationship between physical infrastructure and FDI is positive in the cross section 
study, but mixed in the random effect panel data model. Our findings suggest that 
infrastructure, governance infinstructure in particular, is an important determinant of FDI 
inflows, and it is necessary to improve the quality of governance infrastructure in order 
to attract more direct foreign investment flows. This chapter strengthens the arguments 
of Hall and Jones (1999), and Globerman and Shapiro (2002) by providing the 
comprehensive infrastructure index constructed with PCA, and by implementing the 
random effect econometric technique. The empirical results based on the developing
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countries only data set do not change the main conclusion, thus they are not reported in 
the paper; instead, they are available through the author.
It is necessary to point out the limitations of this study. First, our data mainly comes 
6 om the World Development Indicator (2003), which is one of the best data sources for 
research related to a broad range of developing countries. However, even some of the 
data has to be treated with caution because of the differences in data collecting, 
calculating and documenting methods. Second, our sample countries included in the 
cross section and panel study are not exactly the same, but we try to include as many 
countries as possible. Third, the random effect model covers only four points of time, 
which is too short to provide any accurate conclusions about the dynamic changes of the 
explanatory variables such as physical and governance infrastructures.
3.6. Conclusion
FDI counts for about one fourth of the international capital flows, and it is considered 
as a reliable source of funds associated with the provision of managerial and information 
services, advanced technology, and efficient marketing strategies. FDI not only 
facilitates economic growth, but also advocates democratic political environment, better 
culture understanding and more tolerance on different beliefs and religions. Many 
countries, developing and transition economies in particular, provide special tax 
incentives to attract FDI.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether physical and governance 
infrastructures have positive impacts on FDI inflows. In addition, we construct a 
comprehensive infrastructure index with principal component analysis. The Physical 
Infrastructure Index is built on energy, transportation, telecommunication, sanitation.
8 1
water, and communication measurements, while most of the previous literature use only 
one of those indicators to represent the whole physical infrastructure development. The
Governance Infrastructure Index covers Voice and accountability. Political stability, 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption; 
the six aggregate governance measurements are constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2003).
The simple OLS results suggest that both physical and governance infrastructures are 
positively related with FDI inflows; however, the physical infrastructure coefficients are 
not significant at the conventional statistic level. The random effect panel model 
indicates that governance infrastructure has positive and significant impact on FDI, while 
physical infrastructure has mixed results. The results also confirm the previous literature 
that human capital and market size play a positive role on FDI, and government 
consumption is negatively correlated with FDI inflows.
The empirical results indicate that governance infrastructure is an important 
determinant of FDI inflows, and it is necessary to improve the quality of governance 
infrastructure in order to attract more direct foreign investment flows. Our findings 
strengthen the literature by providing the comprehensive infrastructure index constructed 
with PCA, and by implementing both the OLS and the random effect econometric 
techniques.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 3.1: Physical In&astructure Measurements
Cross Section Data Panel Data
95-02 95-96, 97-98 and 99-00 01-02
1. Commercial energy use (kg 
of oil equivalent per capita)
2. Electric power consumption 
(kwh per capita)
3. Health expenditure per 
capita (current USD)
4. Roads, paved (% of total 
roads)
5. Telephone mainlines (per
1,000 people)
6. Television sets (per 1,000 
people)
7. Improved sanitation 
facilities (% of population 
with access)
8. Improved water source (% 
of population with access)
1. Commercial energy use (kg 
of oil equivalent per capita)
2. Electric power consumption 
(kwh per capita)
3. Health expenditure per 
capita (current USD)
4. Roads, paved (% of total 
roads)
5. Telephone mainlines (per
1,000 people)
6. Television sets (per 1,000 
people)
7. Air transport, freight 
(million tons per km)
8. Passenger cars (per 1,000 
people)
1. Air transport, 
freight (million tons 
per km)
2. Telephone 
mainlines (per 1,000 
people)
3. Television sets (per
1,000 people)
Note: Data are from the World Bank Publication: World Development Indicator (2003),
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Appendix 3.2: Cross Section Country List
Albania Cuba Iraq Nigeria Tanzania
Algeria Cyprus Jamaica Oman Thailand
Angola Dominican Rep. Jordan Pakistan Trinidad Tobago
Australia Ecuador Kazakhstan Panama Tunisia
Austria Egypt, Arab Rep. Kenya Paraguay Turkey
Azerbaijan El Salvador Korea, Rep. Pern Ukraine
Bangladesh Ethiopia Kyrgyz Republic Philippines United Kingdom
Benin Finland Lebanon Romania United States
Bolivia Gabon Libya Saudi Arabia Uruguay
Brazil Georgia Lithuania Senegal Uzbekistan
Bulgaria Ghana Malta Singapore Venezuela, RB
Cameroon Guatemala Mexico Slovak Republic Vietnam
Canada Haiti Moldova South Africa Yemen, Rep.
Chile Honduras Morocco Sri Lanka Zimbabwe
China Hungary Mozambique Sudan
Colombia India Myanmar Sweden
Congo, Rep. Indonesia Netherlands Syrian Arab Rep.
Costa Rica Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Tajikistan
Appendix 3.3: Panel Data Country List
Algeria Cyprus Israel Nigeria Thailand
Angola Czech Republic Italy Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Argentina Denmark Jamaica Oman Turkey
Armenia Ecuador Japan Pakistan Ukraine
Austria Egypt, Arab Rep. Kazakhstan Panama Uni. Arab Emirates
Azerbaijan El Salvador Kenya Peru United Kingdom
Bahrain Estonia Korea, Rep. Philippines United States
Bangladesh Ethiopia Kuwait Poland Uruguay
Belarus Finland Latvia Qatar Venezuela, RB
Belgium France Lithuania Romania Zimbabwe
Bolivia Gabon Malaysia Senegal
Brazil Gambia, The Malta Singapore
Brunei Greece Mexico Slovak Republic
Bulgaria Guatemala Moldova Slovenia
Cameroon Hungary Morocco South Africa
Chile Iceland Mozambique Spain
Colombia India Netherlands Sri Lanka
Costa Rica Indonesia New Zealand Sudan
Cuba Ireland Nicaragua Sweden
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Appendix 3.4: Cross Section Infrastructure Index (95-02)
Country
Name
Physical
Index Rank
Country
Name Governance Index
United States 17.70035606 1 Finland 10.36082877
Canada 14.83582711 2 Netherlands 10.33770063
Sweden 14.3005602 3 Sweden 9.733911013
Finland 12.98859935 4 Singapore 9.665012107
Australia 10.87145937 5 United Kingdom 9.411237918
Netherlands 10.5290046 6 Canada 9.161846024
United Kingdom 10.19539755 7 Australia 9.16103567
Austria 9.664434374 8 Austria 8.918037709
Singapore 8.16527557 9 United States 8.414120537
Malta 6.490247375 10 Chile 6.373660258
Cyprus 5.271118158 11 Cyprus 5.31802471
Slovak Republic 4.62156366 12 Hungary 4.813576991
Korea, Rep. 4.459274026 13 Malta 4.740779609
Bulgaria 4.167696333 14 Costa Rica 4.641019432
Trinidad Tobago 3.776840452 15 Uruguay 3.89004626
Hungary 3.569632453 16 Oman 3.358101778
Uruguay 3.535483828 17 Korea, Rep. 3.10833092
Ukraine 3.403303133 18 Trinidad Tobago 2.505314051
Saudi Arabia 3.068717039 19 Lithuania 2.312462877
Lebanon 2.540676725 20 Slovak Republic 2.268495752
Kazakhstan 1.671673923 21 South Africa 1.648712188
Lithuania 1.239205069 22 Tunisia 1.395584231
Georgia 0.912414147 23 Thailand 1.201538041
Jamaica 0.868215656 24 Panama 1.120112838
Moldova 0.768015426 25 Jordan 0.991917894
Chile 0.538960482 26 Jamaica 0.256645761
Libya 0.510552484 27 Brazil 0.219187113
Oman 0.397411304 28 Morocco 0.147898745
Uzbekistan 0.349885396 29 Bulgaria 0.131583957
Thailand 0.325974181 30 Mexico -0.024757971
Jordan 0.200075887 31 El Salvador -0.068711989
South Africa 0.189234737 32 Philippines -0.165891228
Turkey -0.009537297 33 Benin -0.312857097
Azerbaijan -0.191805516 34 Saudi Arabia -0.336349388
Costa Rica -0.210269438 35 India -0.536501727
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.378631616 36 Romania -0.621698895
Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.382111639 37 Dominican Rep. -0.706750745
Cuba -0.502804616 38 Ghana -0.858807826
Panama -0.667526129 39 Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.990001423
Venezuela, RB -0.692137277 40 Peru -1.005462547
Mexico -0.737612765 41 Bolivia -1.069479383
Brazil -0.76548296 42 Turkey -1.221195682
Colombia -1.081637623 43 Lebanon -1.229383564
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Physical
Index Rank
Country
Name Governance Index
Iraq -1.088965351 44 China -1.506869444
Tajikistan -1.288132299 45 Sri Lanka -1.527622374
Algeria -1.301055338 46 Senegal -1.640441105
Kyrgyz Republic -1.302254362 47 Nicaragua -1.98347392
Tunisia -1.405570114 48 Moldova -2.167138801
Albania -1.80934567 49 Honduras -2.185075437
Romania -1.927713772 50 Tanzania -2.419952191
Ecuador -2.096221031 51 Albania -2.50692735
Dominican Rep. -2.116388889 52 Gabon -2.549668117
Sri Lanka -2.222431245 53 Colombia -2.5891082
Paraguay -2.264672631 54 Mozambique -2.641181145
Syrian Arab Rep. -2.383449876 55 Guatemala -2.653552438
El Salvador -2.577567421 56 Vietnam -2.852446505
Guatemala -2.647062082 57 Bangladesh -2.90295174
Morocco -2.750149155 58 Kyrgyz Republic -2.973453119
Philippines -2.833775159 59 Ecuador -3.007305634
Honduras -3.066412128 60 Ethiopia -3.155783366
Gabon -3.099212282 61 Venezuela, RB -3.2230325
Pakistan -3.114840695 62 Kazakhstan -3.281845859
Peru -3.174439638 63 Cuba -3.526060491
Zimbabwe -3.257834494 64 Ukraine -3.545131737
China -3.302749858 65 Iran, Islamic Rep. -3.772971175
Indonesia -3.442499167 66 Paraguay -3.874662069
Nicaragua -3.606196175 67 Pakistan -3.980940411
Bolivia -3.647289044 68 Indonesia -4.042800861
Sudan -3.682726928 69 Georgia -4.05819759
Ghana -3.927755047 70 Syrian Arab Rep. -4.141006435
Senegal -4.017408787 71 Kenya -4.16613881
Vietnam -4.047837971 72 Yemen, Rep. ^.336367883
India -4.256671907 73 Zimbabwe -4.457959182
Tanzania -4.421636152 74 Cameroon ^.524935919
Bangladesh -4.565784627 75 Azerbaijan -4.848260945
Yemen, Rep. ^.656544158 76 Algeria -5.592445834
Kenya ^.725514635 77 Haiti -6.117449878
Myanmar -4.912775385 78 Uzbekistan -6.12463593
Cameroon -4.917401366 79 Nigeria -6.241104104
Nigeria -4.995679444 80 Congo, Rep. -6.47666926
Mozambique -6.085779816 81 Libya -6.963136464
Benin -6.294751787 82 Myanmar -7.694984253
Angola -6.620404986 83 Tajikistan -7.815639257
Haiti -6.909551326 84 Sudan -8.064225926
Congo, Rep. -7.308986396 85 Angola -8.083417414
Ethiopia -8.494915733 86 Iraq -10.75163715
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Appendix 3.5: Panel Data Physical In&astructure Index
Country
Name 95-96
C ountry
Name 97-98
Ra
nk
Country
Name 99-00
Country
Name 01-02
U S 15.36649 U S 15.62931 1 U S 15.28326 UK 4.137163
Norway 10.67825 Qatar 10.76809 2 Qatar 10.58808 Sweden 4.036623
Qatar 8.949312 Norway 10.43008 3 Norway 10.49744 Japan 4.017061
Sweden 8.542309 Iceland 8.573755 4 Iceland 10.28574 Norway 3.66495
Japan 8.51056 Sweden 8.007424 5 Sweden 7.806735 Denmark 3.57102
France 8.070216 Japan 7.849972 6 Japan 7.467465 France 3.061341
Iceland 7.710062 France 7.427187 7 Demnark 7.391673 Netherlands 2.860006
Denmark 7.319141 Finland 7.333305 8 Finland 6.833946 Finland 2.215992
Finland 7.150749 Deiunark 7.040181 9 France 6.724003 Korea, Rep. 2.168353
U K 7.001772 UK 6.488019 10 U K 6.593845 Malta 1.73422
Netherlands 6.859871 Netherlands 6.427378 11 Netherlands 6.016923 Latvia 1.685811
Belgium 6.005483 Belgium 5.690344 12 Belgium 5.369148 Qatar 1.685169
Austria 5.85505 Austria 5.292957 13 Austria 4.748869 Belgium 1.675181
NewZealand 4.757979 UA Emirates 4.655481 14 Kuwait 4.601135 Singapore 1.670108
Kuwait 4.643748 New Zealand 4.461252 15 UA Emirates 4.534063 New Zealand 1.615877
UA Emirates 4.574496 Kuwait 4.437232 16 Singapore 4.155552 Austria 1.446582
Singapore 4.406737 Singapore 4.340778 17 NewZealand 4.034906 Estonia 1.169164
Italy 4.280401 Italy 4.204881 18 Italy 3.870014 CzechRep. 0.953934
Israel 3.984552 Israel 3.96474 19 Israel 3.868809 Cyprus 0.883265
Bahrain 3.548034 Ireland 3.515094 20 Ireland 3.516386 Brunei 0.850171
Spain 3.536084 Spain 3.342225 21 Spain 3.357573 Kuwait 0.225004
Korea, Rep. 3.30316 Bahrain 3.235156 22 Korea, Rep. 3.18908 UA Emirates 0.15038
Greece 3.260404 Korea, Rep. 3.217327 23 Bahrain 3.102044 SlovalcRep. 0.141299
Ireland 3.172558 Greece 3.146063 24 Greece 2.877175 Brazil -0.08317
Malta 2.958126 Malta 3.0153 25 Malta 2.819524 Turkey -0.10333
Brunei 2.286705 Bmnei 2.674927 26 Czech Rep. 2.191277 Chile -0.26868
Czech Rep. 2.13824 Czech Rep. 2.339894 27 Slovenia 2.168273 Argentina -0.38956
Slovenia 1.959447 Slovenia 2.205253 28 Brunei 2.034423 Colombia -0.65984
Cyprus 1.480261 Cyprus 1.555557 29 Cyprus 1.590477 Malaysia -0.6676
Slovak Rep. 1.120035 Slovak Rep. 1.084054 30 Slovak Rep. 0.948988 Thailand -0.72902
Bulgaria 1.102524 Uruguay 1.06227 31 Uruguay 0.858714 Moldova -0.81704
Uruguay 0.992399 Bulgaria 0.880723 32 Bulgaria 0.724441 Azerbaijan -0.90619
Estonia 0.856068 Estonia 0.75558 33 Latvia 0.644169 Armenia -1.09905
Ukraine 0.458517 Lithuania 0.562175 34 Estonia 0.607184 Sudan -1.11919
Lithuania 0.41361 Latvia 0.360536 35 TrinTobago 0.371512 EgyptArabRep -1.25853
Latvia 0.284546 Hungary 0.328052 36 Lithuania 0.364834 Ecuador -1.27268
Hungary 0.19215 Ukraine 0.238732 37 Hungary 0.345248 South Africa -1.34142
Belarus 0.114072 Belarus 0.101588 38 Ukraine 0.151578 Cuba -1.40829
Trin&Tobago 0.020669 Trin&Tobago 0.056252 39 Poland -0.07939 Philippines -1.67007
Oman -0.089102 Poland -0.18246 40 Belarus -0.08228 Indonesia -1.74178
Poland -0.371223 Oman -0.2734 41 Oman -0.35408 Morocco -1.75899
Kazakhstan -0.70661 Malaysia -0.95935 42 Malaysia -1.03995 Pakistan -1.81715
Malaysia -0.992188 Kazakhstan -1.08338 43 Argentina -1.05028 Sri Lanka -1.85615
Moldova -1.028731 Argentina -1.10346 44 Kazakhstan -1.14211 India -1.94573
Thailand -1.204834 Thailand -1.12167 45 Thailand -1.18477 Nigeria -2.23736
Argentina -1.220514 Moldova -1.25991 46 Jamaica -1.46605 Kenya -2.33528
Armenia -1.318163 Armenia -1.41376 47 Turkey -1.49138 Bangladesh -2.37851
Azerbaijan -1.323173 Azerbaijan -1.46269 48 Azerbaijan -1.49573 Algeria NA
Jamaica -1.6177 Jamaica -1.46449 49 Romania -1.53792 Angola NA
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Romania -1.724124 Turkey -1.54464 50 Armenia -1.56217 Bahrain NA
Turkey -1.753732 Chile -1.7054 51 Chile -1.56993 Belarus NA
South Africa -1.77255 Romania -1.75998 52 Moldova -1.69137 Bolivia NA
Venezuela, RB -1.962599 Brazil -1.92221 53 Brazil -1.9632 Bulgaria NA
Chile -2.039432 South Africa -2.05362 54 Mexico -2.03266 Cameroon NA
Brazil -2.117511 Venezuela, RB -2.08492 55 South Africa -2.12418 Costa Rica NA
Mexico -2.327855 Mexico -2.19334 56 Venezuela -2.189 El Salvador NA
Cuba -2.474694 Costa Rica -2.37802 57 Costa Rica -2.24148 Ethiopia NA
Costa Rica -2.485304 Panama -2.57899 58 EgyptArabR -2.36592 Gabon NA
Panama -2.537826 Cuba -2.58827 59 Panama -2.44713 Gambia, The NA
EgyptArabRep -2.585348 EgyptArabRep -2.59359 60 Colombia -2.54114 Greece NA
Algeria -2.902139 Colombia -2.6228 61 Cuba -2.59068 Guatemala NA
Colombia -2.972113 Sri Lanka -2.80467 62 Sri Lanka -2.78859 Hungary NA
Morocco -3.127882 Algeria -2.9349 63 Algeria -2.96375 Iceland NA
Indonesia -3.319982 Morocco -3.16312 64 Morocco -3.15814 Ireland NA
India -3.512791 Ecuador -3.36189 65 Gabon -3.19503 Israel NA
El Salvador -3.597301 Indonesia -3.38752 66 El Salvador -3.27914 Italy NA
Ecuador -3.620927 El Salvador -3.44809 67 Ecuador -3.31117 Jamaica NA
Zimbabwe -3.672888 India -3.53692 68 Indonesia -3.3937 Kazakhstan NA
Pakistan -3.774857 Zimbabwe -3.70606 69 Sudan -3.51509 Lithuania NA
Peru -3.778715 Paldstan -3.75854 70 Pakistan -3.64231 Mexico NA
Sri Lanka -3.869929 Peru -3.78584 71 India -3.70999 Mozambique NA
Philippines -3.995789 Gabon -3.83529 72 Zimbabwe -3.76367 Nicaragua NA
Sudan -4.022218 Pliilippines -4.00683 73 Pern -3.77169 Oman NA
Gabon -4.058328 Guatemala -4.00781 74 Guatemala -3.83878 Panama NA
Guatemala -4.078584 Sudan -4.0756 75 Philippines -3.8907 Pern NA
Gambia, Tire -4.14207 Gambia, The -4.14016 76 Bolivia -4.08183 Poland NA
Bolivia ^.172146 Bolivia ^.16025 77 Gambia, The -4.11718 Romania NA
Senegal ^.343827 Nigeria ^.21604 78 Nigeria -4.20336 Senegal NA
Nicaragua -4.385575 Senegal -4.36729 79 Senegal -4.33693 Slovenia NA
Nigeria -4.404807 Nicaragua ^.44305 80 Nicaragua -4.39908 Spain NA
Angola -4.527456 Angola -4.55068 81 Cameroon -4.65757 Trin.&Tobago NA
Cameroon -4.693684 Cameroon -4.70526 82 Kenya -4.67453 Ukraine NA
Kenya -4.695723 Kenya -4.73133 83 Mozambique -4.72854 United States NA
Mozambique -4.745315 Mozambique -4.77696 84 Angola -4.74959 Uruguay NA
Ethiopia -4.820581 Ethiopia -4.87905 85 Ethiopia -4.85424 Venezuela, RB NA
Bangladesh -4.95748 Bangladesh -4.95887 86 Bangladesh -4.88293 Zimbabwe NA
Appendix 3.6: Panel Data Governance In6astructure Index
Country
Name 95-96
Country
Name 97-98 Rank
Country
Name 99-00
Country
Name 01-02
New Zealand 9.6227 Netherlands 10.63 1 Finland 10.811 Finland 11.008
Netherlands 9.4638 Finland 10.28 2 Netherlands 10.554 Netherlands 10.4
Norway 9.2 New Zealand 10.19 3 Iceland 10.469 Denmark 10.355
Denmark 9.1173 Denmark 10.06 4 Singapore 10.187 New Zealand 10.219
Finland 9.0568 Norway 10.006 5 Sweden 9.8286 Iceland 10.199
Singapore 9.0486 UK 9.9187 6 Denmark 9.7519 Sweden 10.198
Sweden 8.9686 Sweden 9.6886 7 U K 9.6029 Norway 9.8664
U K 8.4831 Singapore 9.6508 8 New Zealand 9.3024 Singapore 9.5249
Austria 8.1987 Ireland 9.1883 9 Ireland 9.1974 United Kingdom 9.3527
Ireland 8.0494 Iceland 8.8559 10 Austria 9.1253 Austria 9.3103
United States 8.0121 Austria 8.7945 11 Norway 8.8437 Ireland 8.8455
France 7.1125 US 8.663 12 U S 8.771 Belgium 8.215
Belgium 6.8616 Spain 7.4425 13 Spain 7.7638 United States 7.9551
Iceland 6.7485 France 7.043 14 France 6.8604 France 7.3184
Japan 6.0083 Belgium 6.3773 15 Belgium 6.8345 Chile 7.2788
Chile 5.7618 Japan 6.346 16 Japan 6.8036 Spain 7.204
Spain 5.3908 Chile 5.7796 17 Chile 6.5041 Malta 6.4906
Israel 4.9271 Italy 5.7209 18 Cyprus 5.5036 Japan 6.4452
Cyprus 4.8618 Cyprus 5.7195 19 Costa Rica 5.4793 Slovenia 5.5425
Czech Rep. 4.2908 Hungary 5.211 20 Estonia 5.0326 Hungary 5.3753
Italy 4.026 Malta 4.98 21 Hungary 4.9955 Estonia 5.2759
Brunei 3.8611 Costa Rica 4.758 22 Slovenia 4.9928 Italy 5.2676
Slovenia 3.825 Slovenia 4.6131 23 Italy 4.8442 Cyprus 4.9939
Costa Rica 3.6029 Israel 4.3899 24 Uruguay 4.8205 Greece 4.8551
Hungary 3.4893 Poland 4.1389 25 Greece 4.6831 Czech Republic 4.5494
Malaysia 3.3841 Czech Rep. 4.0746 26 Israel 4.4331 Costa Rica 4.5373
Greece 3.3394 Greece 3.9383 27 Malta 4.3052 U A Emirates 4.2313
Uruguay 3.2906 Oman 3.772 28 Qatar 3.921 Uruguay 3.9095
Estonia 3.1668 Estonia 3.7155 29 Oman 3.8944 Poland 3.8636
Malta 3.0636 Qatar 3.6589 30 Czech Rep. 3.8126 Lithuania 3.8589
Korea, Rep. 2.9563 Uruguay 3.3655 31 U A Emirates 3.7474 Korea, Rep. 3.8198
Poland 2.8455 Malaysia 2.9888 32 Poland 3.664 Latvia 3.5499
Oman 2.2735 Trin. Tobago 2.9529 33 Korea, Rep. 3.1537 Slovak Republic 3.4883
U A Emirates 2.2687 U A Emirates 2.7394 34 Trin. Tobago 2.9858 Oman 3.4399
Trin. Tobago 2.0328 Korea, Rep. 2.4373 35 Kuwait 2.5546 Israel 3.3416
Argentina 1.9624 Kuwait 2.4094 36 Lithuania 2.5244 Brunei 3.1165
Slovak Republic 1.5085 Argentina 1.9974 37 Slovak Rep. 2.5151 Bahrain 3.1138
Qatar 1.4248 Latvia 1.8246 38 Brunei 2.2587 Qatar 2.7761
Kuwait 1.3871 Lithuania 1.6317 39 Latvia 2.2311 Malaysia 2.5957
South Africa 1.2189 Bahrain 1.5985 40 South Africa 2.0216 South Africa 2.1906
Lithuania 1.1747 Slovak Rep. 1.5052 41 Bahrain 1.7855 Kuwait 2.1209
Latvia 1.0544 Panama 1.5021 42 Malaysia 1.7432 Trinidad Tobago 1.9171
Thailand 0.9934 Brunei 1.2899 43 Panama 1.6101 Bulgaria 1.4162
Jamaica 0.3991 South Africa 1.1167 44 Thailand 1.3617 Thailand 1.4111
Panama 0.3483 Thailand 0.9785 45 Argentina 1.2969 Panama 0.8681
Bahrain 0.2578 Philippines 0.9169 46 El Salvador 1.0385 Mexico 0.7088
Philippines 0.0417 El Salvador 0.8244 47 Morocco 0.8603 Brazil 0.0933
Brazil -0.203 Morocco 0.5807 48 Jamaica 0.8012 Romania -0.021
Mexico -0.609 Brazil 0.242 49 Brazil 0.6893 Jamaica -0.196
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Country
Name 97-98 Rank
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Country
Name 01-42
Morocco -0.622 Bolivia 0.2387 50 Bulgaria 0.5103 Morocco -0.232
India -0.785 Jamaica -0.066 51 Mexico 0.2323 Sri Lanka -0.603
Turkey -0.834 India -0.231 52 India -0.107 Senegal -0.928
Romania -0.837 Mexico -0.478 53 Egypt, A. Rep. -0.165 India -1.022
Bulgaria -0.893 Bulgaria -0.533 54 Gambia, The -0.357 El Salvador -1.087
Egypt, Arab Rep. -1.033 Romania -0.568 55 Philippines -0.492 Philippines -1.227
El Salvador -1.199 Peru -0.65 56 Peru -0.774 Peru -1.238
Moldova -1.209 Egypt, A. Rep. -0.723 57 Bolivia -1.085 Turkey -1.433
Colombia -L326 Ethiopia 58 Romania -1.093 Gabon -1.614
Bolivia -L382 Turkey -1.123 59 Senegal -1.391 Egypt, Arab Rep. -2.018
Peru -1.399 Moldova -1.437 60 Turkey -1.5 Nicaragua -2.073
Sri Lanka -1.467 Gambia, The -1.591 61 Mozambique -1.968 Bolivia -2.163
Zimbabwe -1.552 Nicaragua -1.669 62 Sri Lanka -2.092 Armenia -2.242
Gambia, The -L672 Guatemala -1.864 63 Nicaragua -2.098 Mozambique -2.376
Indonesia -1.745 Sri Lanka -1.951 64 Guatemala -2.48 Moldova -2.484
Senegal -Z066 Bangladesh -1.999 65 Bangladesh -2.508 Guatemala -2.989
Armenia -2 106 Senegal -2.108 66 Gabon Gambia, The -3.045
Nicaragua -2T14 Ecuador -2.21 67 Kazakhstan -2.968 Argentina -3.284
Ecuador -2256 Colombia -2.222 68 Colombia -3.151 Ukraine -3.42
Venezuela, RB -2284 Venezuela, RB -2.24 69 Armenia -3.316 Colombia -3.65
Bangladesh -2.692 Zimbabwe -2.454 70 Venezuela, RB -3.375 Ecuador -3.747
Cuba -2.791 Armenia -2.522 71 Moldova -3.473 Cuba -3.857
Ukraine -2.9 Gabon -2.669 72 Cameroon -3.614 Kazakhstan -3.866
Kenya -2146 Mozambique -2.828 73 Ethiopia -3.689 Bangladesh -4.412
Ethiopia -3.213 Kazakhstan -2.926 74 Ecuador -3.821 Algeria -4.499
Gabon -3.281 Cuba -3.396 75 Pakistan -3.874 Kenya -4.607
Kazakhstan -3.291 Pakistan -3.4 76 Cuba -3.875 Ethiopia -4.657
Guatemala -3 316 Ukraine -3.52 77 Ukraine Pakistan -4.7
Mozambique -2346 Cameroon -3.92 78 Kenya -4.403 Indonesia -4.734
Pakistan -3.832 Kenya ^.428 79 Azerbaijan ^.434 Venezuela, RB -4.968
Belarus -4^52 Azerbaijan -4.615 80 Indonesia -4.866 Cameroon -5.183
Azerbaijan ^.809 Indonesia ^.785 81 Belams -5.319 Azerbaijan -5.381
Algeria -5.235 Belarus -5.136 82 Algeria -5.45 Belarus -5.592
Cameroon -5.31 Nigeria -6.143 83 Nigeria -5/468 Nigeria -6.777
Nigeria -6.441 Algeria -6.905 84 Zimbabwe -6L241 Zimbabwe -7.516
Angola -7.417 Angola -7.825 85 Sudan -7.753 Angola -7.658
Sudan -8.58 Sudan -7.835 86 Angola -9.16 Sudan -7.811
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